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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 shows that total anonymity in matching is not a necessary condition to give
rise to the use of money, contrary to the existing literature, which finds that total anonymity
is required. The first paper presents a simple model of direct money search in a decentralized
environment. This paper presents three interesting findings: (i) partial anonymity is suffi-
cient for money to be useful, (ii) commodity money does not exist in symmetric direct money
search at steady state, (iii) bartering and commodity money can co-exist in the asymmetric
case. The introduction of fiat money drives out bartering and commodity money, consistent
with previous studies.
The second chapter presents two thought-provoking results on money search models.
For random money search models, it has been taken for granted that monetary equilibrium
unquestionably holds if the number types of good is greater than three. This chapter reports
that monetary equilibrium in random money search models fail to exist when the number
of types of goods is signficantly greater than three. An increasing number of types of goods
reduces the matching probability and expected utility, ultimately approaching zero as the
number of types of goods approaches infinity. A quasi-direct search model is presented
as a solution for this problem. This leads to another more thought-provoking result: a
connection between two major macroeconomics models, namely cash-in-advance and money
search models.
In Chapter 3, a search-theoretic model is used to show that money is a necessary in-
strument to clear the market. In decentralized markets with imperfect information, money
assumes the role of a perfectly informed Walrasian auctioneer. This chapter presents a novel
framework that utilizes money to clear the market in a decentralized environment, in con-
trast to Lagos and Wright (2005), where a centralized price mechanism clears the market.
Without the use of money, markets with imperfect information are almost impossible to
clear. Markets can exist without money, and the market is not a substitute for money.
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Summary
These three papers have a unifying theme: they present direct money search models
where money matters. This approach differs from the existing literature, which has relied
heavily on random search models of the role of money. The definition of direct search here
means that an agent directly approaches another agent who has the good he wants. The
existing literature commonly uses random search or partially directed search to show how
money matters in the economy. Fully direct search has not been presented in the monetary
economics literature.
The first paper explicitly shows how a person would approach a specific supplier to acquire
a desired good. Like Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), henceforth KW, and Goldberg (2007), I
allow three types of goods in the simple model. Some of the results in this first paper
mirror their earlier results, but some differ. For example, I find that no commodity money
equilibrium exists in a symmetric direct search environment, unlike when search is non-direct.
This is because the non-direct search models assume that each agent cannot consume his
own production, where the type of consumption good and the type of production good are
fixed for each agent. In that environment, quid pro quo trade may emerge, which means
that goods or services are exchanged with one transfer contingent on the other. Non-random
models can lead to a commodity being used as a medium of exchange, because a person
might be better off if he temporarily sacrifices an immediate gain and accepts an unwanted
good that later can be exchanged for a good he wants. That scenario is not possible with
direct search, because an agent would have the same chance of getting his desired good by
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holding his own good or any other good, without having to rely on a quid pro quo exchange.
The primary purpose of this first paper is to clearly show the direct search mechanism in a
simple model that focuses on both symmetric and asymmetric steady-state equilibria. The
major finding is that commodity money does not exist in the symmetric direct money search
model at steady state, but bartering exists. The role of fiat money can still be explicitly
modeled when direct money search is introduced, but it drives out bartering and commodity
money. Fiat monetary equilibrium exists in both symmetric and asymmetric cases.
In the second paper, the importance of the variety of goods in establishing the role of
money is investigated. It has been taken for granted that a fiat money equilibrium always
exists, provided that the number of types of goods exceeds three. This paper shows this
is not necessarily true. In addition, agents in the first paper cannot hold a unit of a good
and a unit of money at the same time, but this second paper relaxes that restriction. This
structure is emphasized because holding money should not prevent or hinder production.
Money is allowed to be a true medium of exchange, free from the production constraint.
Even if a person does not accept money, he may be able to obtain his desired good by
bartering. In KW, if a money-holder cannot meet someone else who will accept his money,
there is no other way to obtain his desired good, such as bartering with his own good,
because each agent can only hold either money or a good in each period. The second paper
also extends the number of goods from three to any arbitrarily large number. While the first
paper draws on the work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), this paper is best compared to a
later paper by Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). This chapter finds that a consistency problem
arises with random search when a large number of goods is assumed. When the types of
goods increase in a random search environment, the willingness to accept money decreases,
but I show that direct search may solve this problem. When the types of goods increase in
direct search, the willingness to accept money increases, which is more consistent with our
intuition and real world observations. The second paper also presents an interesting technical
finding that has not been shown in existing money search models: a link between cash-in-
x
advance models and money search models. This integration of two major macroeconomic
models is incomplete, since I assume that both money and goods are indivisible, while the
cash-in-advance model assumes divisibility in both goods and money. Nevertheless, this
link may serve as a beginning for a proper integration. Such integration is potentially
important because the underlying foundation of cash-in-advance is the concept of general
equilibrium, where all markets potentially clear with a perfect relative price mechanism and
the equilibrium has other desirable attributes. But the conventional general equilibrium
model is a poor one for understanding the fundamental nature and role of money, while
previous money search models have lacked a mechanism for determining relative prices and
clearing markets. Since market clearance is one of the important reasons to integrate the
cash-in-advance and money search models, my third paper suggests a way to achieve market
clearance in a money search model. This chapter is short but perhaps important. If a
market potentially clears within one period, this feature can be extended to multiple periods
for sequential equilibria, permitting analysis of macroeconomic and monetary policies within
a dynamic setting. Currently, there are attempts to achieve market clearance within one
period using a money search model. For example, Lagos and Wright (2006) have modeled
market clearance within a period by introducing two sub-periods: one is a centralized market
with a general good and the other is a decentralized market with specific goods. It is a move
in the direction of merging monetary theory and general equilibrium analysis.
An attempt is made in this third paper to achieve market clearance within a single
period, in the sense that everyone may obtain the good they desire, but this process is made
price-independent by assuming the price of each good is fixed (or that there is no price).
It differs from Lagos and Wright’s (2006) model by only having decentralized markets, and
it captures the notion of market clearance without having to compromise on its flexibility
or the notion that money matters and is used to facilitate trade among agents. Departing
from the traditional models, where a Walrasian auctioneer clears the market given perfect
information, money is a necessary instrument to coordinate market clearing in a decentralized
xi
market system with imperfect information.
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Chapter 1 :
A Simple Model of Direct Money Search
1.1 Introduction
Money search theory has progressed significantly from the seminal random search paper
of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), henceforth KW, to the cooperative directed search approach
of Corbae, Temzelides and Wright (2003), to the partial directed search model of Goldberg
(2007). For several reasons, monetary theorists have sought to develop a fully direct search
model of money.1.1 First, with random matching, who would lend money to a borrower if he
does not even know if he will ever meet that agent again? Second, it is difficult to imagine
that our daily transactions could be conducted in a random way to obtain the things we
want. Finally, Howitt (2003) has simply noted that random search is unusual in the real
world. The challenge, one that is addressed in this paper, is to model credit where the role
of money is also explicit in the model.
Total anonymity (or randomness) as a prerequisite for establishing the role of money
in search, as suggested by Korchelakota (1999), appears to be unnecessary in the following
model. In this direct search approach, only some degree of anonymity is needed to ensure
a useful role for money. This anonymity or randomness arises from imperfect information
1.1This desire to formulate a direct search model of money has been mentioned by KW, Wallace (2007),
Goldberg (2007), Williamson and Wright (2013), Wallace (2013) and others.
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about the preferences of other agents. Unlike the previous money search literature, the idea
of quid pro quo in exchange does not arise in a symmetric case in this direct search model.
This feature distinguishes this paper from earlier money search papers.
Moving toward direct search in a monetary model is important because of the inability
to explicitly incorporate money in existing economic models. One of the solutions stemming
from the Lucas critique is to inject micro-foundations into macroeconomic models, however
money is not explicit in those models, as noted by Wallace (2008). Yet, money is important
to the economy and should not be overlooked or omitted. Several ideas have been put forth to
address this issue. Patinkin (1950) suggested including money in the utility function, Clower
(1967) introduced the cash-in-advance approach, and both Townsend’s (1980) turnpike model
and Wallace’s (1978) overlapping-generations model also address this problem. Yet none of
these earlier models explicitly incorporated money as a medium of exchange.
Using search theory, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) made an important breakthrough
in the monetary literature by explicitly incorporating money as a medium of exchange,
but their models involved random search. The literature has progressed from their fully
random approach to Goldberg’s (2007) partially directed search model. However, non-direct
search (whether random or partially directed) imposes a hurdle to fully integrating money
into economic models, because non-direct search models must assume total anonymity for
money to be essential. This total anonymity in money search theory leads many to question
the validity and significance of this line of research, as noted by Goldberg (2007). One
of the strongest criticisms of the total anonymity assumption is that it prevents further
development of an explicit model of credit, as noted by Wallace (2012). For example, would
you loan money to anyone, not knowing if or when you will meet him again in the future
or when you do not know who the next person will be? This is the “credit problem" in
the random search literature. But, the problem does not end here, because it also prevents
modeling loans and banking, including the role of a central bank. This study starts with
simple but essential questions of why money matters, why it also matters in credit, and how
2
money can be explicitly modeled using direct search.
Another basic criticism of random search, by Howitt (2005), is that people normally do
not randomly meet others to obtain the goods they want. They commonly know where to
go to get specific goods. If we know a particular seller does not have the good we want,
we simply would not visit that seller. Randomness in trade matching only makes sense
if individuals meet once and are very unlikely to meet again in the future. Examples of
such random matching may exist (ancient Silk Road trading, exchange in Venice or other
historically important trading ports, contemporary swap meets, etc.), where traders come
and go without knowing if they will ever meet again, but such anonymous trading encounters
are not the norm.
In the conventional random search setup, where consumption and production type are
individual specific, knowing a person’s production immediately reveals his consumption pref-
erence. This assumption of fixed consumption and production types hinders the modeling
of direct money search, because it eliminates the double coincidence of wants. When you
search directly, knowing the seller type also gives you additional information about the type
of good he wants. Thus, if you do not hold the good he wants, you would not approach
him. You only approach him if you have the good he wants and you also want the good
he holds. This ensures the double coincidence of wants and eliminates the need for money.
The absence of double coincidence of wants is a necessary condition for money to serve as a
medium of exchange. Thus, the random search approach makes it hard to properly explore
the emergence of money and its economic role.
This first chapter addresses a fundamental question: Can money be explicitly modeled
in a direct search framework? Some simple modifications are made. I maintain the setup of
fixed production types, but drop the assumptions of fixed consumption types and random
search by generalizing consumption and introducing direct search with only three goods.
The restriction to three goods makes it easier to compare results with those of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989) and Goldberg (2007), who also made this assumption.
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In Section 1.2 of this chapter, the basic model is described. In Section 1.3, we investi-
gate the condition where an autarkic equilibrium can emerge in asymmetric and symmetric
cases. In Section 1.4, we investigate the equilibrium for barter and commodity money under
symmetric and asymmetric cases. Fiat money is introduced into the model in Section 1.5
and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Model
This paper is somewhat closer in structure to Goldberg (2007) than KW, but like both
of those papers, the variety of goods is limited to three to keep the model simple and to
facilitate the comparison of results.
1.2.1 Baseline
A continuum of infinitely lived agents with unit mass face an environment that contains
a set of only three goods, I = {1, 2, 3}. Besides the three goods, there is an intrinsically
worthless and inconvertible object called “fiat money", introduced later in Section 1.5. All
three goods and money are indivisible and exist in units of one. Each of the three goods has
the same price, or the three goods always trade on a one-for-one basis with no reference to
any price. To facilitate the understanding of why we want to hold money in the exchanges
of goods, prices are not a discussed here. Trade is bilateral, mutual, and unforced.
Each agent has three roles: (i) producer, (ii) consumer, and (iii) holder of a good. Hence-
forth, for simplicity, a producer of good type i is called an “i-producer ”, a consumer of good
type i is called an“i-consumer ”, and a holder of good type i is called an “i-holder ”. In his
role as a producer, each agent has a fixed type of production and engages in a specialized
production of good type i in each period. His role as a consumer consists of drawing a “taste"
or type of good he wants to consume and he engages in a generalized consumption of all
type of goods. Each agent initially draws a taste shock from a uniform distribution, and he
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repeats this process after consuming a desired good. If he does not acquire his desired good,
his taste remains the same until he acquires and consumes his desired good. At that point,
a new taste shock is drawn. Once a good is in his possession, he becomes a holder of that
good and also can choose to hold that good rather than consuming or trading it away.
Let Vijk be the value function of an agent who produces good i, wants to consume good
j, and holds good k, where i, j, k 2 I. Agents receive utility u > 0 from consuming their
desired good and disutility d   0 from production, as well as incurring a transaction cost
⌧ > 0 when an agent exchanges a good. An agent can only produce after consuming the good
he desires. An agent produces another unit of his output only after consuming his desired
good. If an agent draws a taste shock to consume the good he produces, he will immediately
consume that good and draw another taste shock.1.2 So, each agent will end up wanting to
consume a good i⇤ 6= i, where i⇤ 2 {j, k}, which he cannot produce. He must therefore rely
on trade to acquire the desired good. Each agent can only hold either one unit of production
or one unit of money at a time. Money is loosely conceived in this section because it can
be commodity money (which is accepting one of the commodities as money) or fiat money
(where a fraction of m agents is endowed with one unit of fiat money).
1.2.2 Location and Information
There are three potential locations to visit and each is called a marketplace. Each agent
lives at home and his home is also his “factory" or production site. Each marketplace is
1.2Let Viii be the value function of an agent who draws a desire to consume his own output i, such that
Viii =
1
3
(u  d+ Viii) + 2
3
Viji
where j 6= i. This means he has a probability of 13 wanting to consume his own output, which provides a
net utility of u  d before drawing another taste shock and 23 wanting to consume something other than his
own output. Let the expected net utility after acquiring his consumption be U = u + 16 (u   d)   ⌧ , then
Viii = U   u+ ⌧   Viji. Viii = u  d+ 13 (Viii + Viji + Viki), Viii = 12 (u  a) + 12 (Viji + Viki). Then the value
of acquiring the good he desires u+ 13 (Viii + Viji + Viki) will be u+
1
6 (u  d) + 12 (Viji + Viki), which can be
simplified to:
U +
1
2
(Viji + Viki).
5
Figure 1.1: Marketplaces and travel paths among agents in a direct search.
a location where a specific type of good is sold, and the marketplace is close to the home,
so the cost of taking his production to market is negligible. Unlike in Goldberg (2007),
the marketplace is separate from the home. This set-up avoids agents of the same type
knowing what good their neighbors hold when they are at home, and it avoids trading among
themselves without visiting a marketplace if they hold different goods. An i-producer must
go to market i to sell his produced good, which is the marketplace that allows i-producers
holding good i to gather and sell. People who visit market i can only trade for good i.
The idea of such a market can be related to having a good-specific place to facilitate
search and exchange. If a market were to allow other than its own production good to be
sold, it would become a location where a seller could be selling any type of good. People
would randomly search to get their good, and if this occurs, the environment would resemble
the one in random search models. It is hard to imagine that a fisherman wants a carpenter,
cobbler, or mechanic to sell their goods or services in his fish market. This sort of “mixed
marketplace" is not allowed in this model; only good i can be sold at market i. A marketplace
is a location of exchange for suppliers offering one specific type of good only. If a supplier
does not hold the good of his own production type, he can still visit his own marketplace,
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but he is not allowed to offer other goods for exchange. Only an i-type is allowed to be a
supplier at marketplace i to offer good i for trade. If an i-producer holds good i⇤ 6= i, he
cannot offer it for trade at market i.
Everyone knows the location of each market and the type of product being sold there.
Everyone also knows his own taste, but not other agents’ tastes. This differs significantly
from KW and Goldberg (2007). Hence, an agent’s current taste is private information, which
is only revealed to another agent after they engage in a bilateral meeting (trade need not
occur). To ensure the absence of double coincidence of wants, even the type of good his
partner wants is revealed to him after they meet and have parted, so he could approach her
again in the future when he has her desired good, hoping for a guaranteed barter exchange.
1.3 However, if she later wants a different good because she already acquired her desired good
and drew a new taste shock,1.4 a double-coincidence of wants for a barter exchange may not
occur. For this reason, there are only double coincidence of wants and single coincidence of
wants in this model.
Goldberg (2007) assumes that agents do not know which shops are available and the
types of goods being offered. His assumption is crucial for his model because it motivates
the lack of double coincidence of wants and gives rise to the need for a medium of exchange.
I will investigate dropping this assumption to create a more realistic environment, where
agents know which shops and goods are available. Every agent in my model knows this
information.
1.2.3 Search and Match Mechanism
After establishing a location, each agent needs to choose which market he wants to visit.
If Agent i who produces i, goes to market i to wait for visitors, he is called a “stayer" at his
1.3To facilitate discussion and avoid confusion, I use a masculine pronoun for one agent and a feminine
pronoun for his trading partner.
1.4A larger number of good types accentuates the absence of double coincidence of wants. For further
discussion of this issue, see chapter 2 of this dissertation. The current chapter only focuses on symmetric
equilibria and how the search mechanism works in a simple model, so that results can be compared to those
of KW and Goldberg (2007).
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own marketplace. If Agent i goes to market j or k to look for goods, he is called a “searcher".
There is no travel cost going to his own market i because the market is very near and travel
cost becomes negligible.1.5 However, a travel cost, ci   0 , is incurred when he travels from
his home to markets other than his own. An agent must return to his home at the end of
each period, and another travel cost is incurred on the way home. So total travel cost of
any visit is 2ci. No agent is allowed to consume goods in any market in the model; he must
return home to consume.1.6.
In each period, a stayer always arrives before any visitors at his market because the
market is closer to him, as depicted in Figure 1.1. If agents choose to search, then all
searchers will arrive at the same time at the market1.7. Stayers at any particular market
are ex-ante identical, holding the same type of good. Recall that information about the
type of good a stayer wants to consume in that particular period is unknown or uncertain
to searchers visiting the market. If searchers know this piece of information, the friction of
matching vanishes and it becomes a Walrasian market.
All searchers arrive at a market at the same time and all the stayers are identical to them
because all stayers sell identical goods. Searchers would choose randomly which stayer to
meet bilaterally because it makes no difference in terms of outcome. He knows that anyone
he approaches in that market will provide the particular good he wants in exchange for the
good he holds. No one can meet more than once each period and all agents will go home
and wait for the next period after each bilateral meeting.
In the bilateral meeting, agents are only allowed to meet one partner. The arrival rate,
↵ii, is the chance that Agent i stays in his own market i and meets with an arriving visitor
for possible trade. The arrival rate, ↵ii⇤ , where i⇤ 6= i, is the chance that Agent i searches
at a different market i⇤ to meet a stayer for possible trade. The arrival rates, ↵ii,↵ii⇤ =
1.5Alternatively, we could assume that travel costs of going to other markets are normalized to the travel
cost to his own market.
1.6Goldberg (2007) allows consumption on the spot, but that assumption would not affect the equilibrium
results that follow.
1.7It would be interesting to explore the effects of different market arrival times by specifying a circular
geography with different distances between sites.
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↵(n12, n13, n21, n23, n31, n32), depend on the proportions each type of agent who search (nij
where i, j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j). No more than one searcher will visit a stayer at a time. Since
each Agent i will want to consume either good j or k in each period, and the taste shock
is drawn from a uniform distribution, half of the i-type agents will always want to consume
good j and the other half will want to consume good k in the symmetric case. The arrival
rates will depend on the proportions of each type of agent who search, as follows:
↵ii = {
nji+nki
2 nij nik if
nji+nki
2 nij nik < 1
1 if nji+nki2 nij nik   1
(1.1)
↵ij = {
2 nji njk
nij+nkj
if 2 nji njknij+nkj < 1
1 if 2 nji njknij+nkj   1
(1.2)
↵ik = {
2 nki nkj
nik+njk
if 2 nki nkjnik+njk < 1
1 if 2 nki nkjnik+njk   1
(1.3)
In 1.1, if Agent i stays at this marketplace, he will meet a visitor with probability equal
to the ratio of the people (nji+nki) who produce good j and k to the number of stayers (2 
nij   nik).
When visitors equal or exceed stayers, the arrival rate is one, ↵ii = 1. It means each
stayer will definitely meet with one searcher. The stayers will conduct a lottery as to which
ones the visitors will meet, for the case where visitors exceed stayers. When there are fewer
visitors than stayers, the arrival rate is the ratio of visitors to stayers. The searchers will
conduct a lottery as to whom to meet. In (1.2), Agent i meets a stayer in market j with
probability equal to the ratio of the proportion of Agent j stayers to the proportion of agents
who visit market j. If stayers exceed visitors, then the arrival rate is one for Agent i visiting
market j, ↵ij = 1. If visitors exceed stayers, the visitors will conduct a lottery to determine
who will have a chance to meet with the stayers. The third equation is similar to the second
equation, so the explanation is omitted.
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1.2.4 Strategies and Equilibrium
Following Goldberg (2007), agents choose two strategies: (i) location and (ii) trading. As
for the location strategy, an agent chooses which market he wants to visit. Vxyz is the value
function of an agent at the end of a period who produces good x 2 I, wants to consume
good y 2 I, holds good z 2 I, and who faces three location strategies: visit market i, market
j, or market k, given that   is the discount factor:
Vxyz =  max { visit market i , visit market j , visit market k} . (1.4)
After choosing his location strategy, he chooses his trading strategy if he gets to meet a
supplier. He becomes a “seller” when when he exchanges his good for money (or for something
he does not consume). He becomes a “buyer” when he exchanges his money (or something
his partner does not consume) for goods. Otherwise, he becomes a “barterer" if both parties
exchange goods for immediate consumption.
As in KW, with the imposition of a positive transaction cost ⌧ , an agent will not trade
if he is indifferent between trading two goods. He always accepts the good he wants to
consume.
Viki =max  {↵ii

1
2
(U +
1
2
(Viki + Viji)) +
1
2
max{Viki, Vikj}
 
+ (1  ↵ii)Viki,
  ci + ↵ij

1
2
Viki +
1
2
max {Viki , Vikj}
 
+ (1  ↵ij)Viki   ci,
  ci + ↵ik

1
2
(U +
1
2
(Viki + Viji)) +
1
2
(⇧1(U +
1
2
(Viki + Viji))) + (1  ⇧1)Viki)
 
  (1  ↵ik)Viki   c
(1.5)
The equation above shows that the expected utility of an agent who produces i, consumes
k, and holds i, at the beginning of a period, with a discount factor   when he holds his own
production good. The first strategy is to visit his own market i, where he meets a partner
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with arrival rate ↵ii, with probability 12 that he gets the good he wants and with probability
1
2
that he does not get the good, but has to decide if he wants to accept good j.
The second strategy is to visit market j, incurring cost ci, where no stayer has the good
he wants and he meets a partner with arrival rate ↵ij, and with probability 12 he meets with
a partner that wants his good that he may want to trade, and with probability 12 nothing
happens. On his way back he incurs another transport cost ci.
The third strategy is visiting market k, incurring cost ci, where every stayer has the good
he wants and he meets a partner with an arrival rate ↵ik, but only with probability 12 he
meets a partner who wants to consume his good and will exchange with him; with probability
1
2 she does not want to consume his good. However, if she is willing to accept his good, then
he can obtain the good he wants to consume. On the return, he incurs another transport
cost ci.
Vikj = max  {Vikj ,   ci + ↵ij

1
2
Vikj +
1
2
max{Viki , Vikj}
 
+ (1  ↵ij)Viki   ci,
  ci + ↵ik

1
2
(U +
1
2
(Viki + Viji)) +
1
2
(⇧1(U +
1
2
(Viki + Viji))) + (1  ⇧1)Viki)
 
  (1  ↵ik)Viki   ci}
(1.6)
Equation (1.6) shows the value function for Agent i at the beginning of a period when
he wants to consume good k and holds good j. Market i does not allow any goods other
than good i to be ‘sold’, so Agent i holding good j will not be able to trade at all going to
marketi as shown as the first strategy.
Since market i does not allow any other goods to be ’sold’ except good i, then Agent i
holding good j will not be able to trade at all going to market i, shown as the first strategy.
The second strategy is going to market j where no stayer wants the good j brought by him
because no stayer will want to trade for the same type of good j. The third strategy is going
to market k where the stayer has the good he wants, with a transport cost cj, and he will
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readily exchange because market k only sells his consumption good. With the probability
1
2 he meets with a partner who wants his good j, otherwise he meets a partner who does
not want his good, times the arrival rate ↵ij. Then he returns home with another transport
cost, cj.
Lemma 1.1. Value functions are non-negative.
Definition 1.1. An equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with a set of steady-state strategies
for trading and location, where expected utility is maximized, given the strategies played by
other agents, and its distribution results from the chosen strategies.
There are two cases here: (i) symmetric and (ii) asymmetric. The symmetric case is
considered, such that the transport costs for all goods are equal (c1 = c2 = c3 = c). The
asymmetric case is one where the transport costs are unequal and c1 < c2 < c3.
1.3 Autarkic
There is an autarkic equilibrium where everyone stays at their own market, no one wants
to visit a market other than their own. Consider the case where no one searches.
1.3.1 Symmetric Case
In equation [1.7], V131 denotes the value function of an agent who produces good 1, wants
to consume good 3 and holds good 1. The agent has three strategies: (i) stay at his own
market 1, (ii) go to market 2 or (iii) go to market 3. If he stays at his own market 1, no
trade happens because no one visits him. If he searches, he is the only searcher in the market
(either 1 or 2). If he goes to market 2, he incurs a transport cost. Since he wants to consume
good 3 but market 2 only offers good 2, he will not get his desired consumption good. There
are two possibilities in market 2: (1) if he meets a producer who wants to consume good 1 ,
he can choose to accept good 2 by giving up his good 1 to become a holder of good 2 in the
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next period, or (2) if he meets a producer who wants to consume good 3 and does not accept
his good 1, nothing happens and he goes home. His value function would be:
V131 = max  {V131, c+1
2
(V131)+
1
2
max{V131, V132} c, c+1
2
(U+
1
2
(V131+V121))+
1
2
V131 c}
(1.7)
If he goes to market 3, he incurs the same transport cost as going to market 2, but market
3 only sells his desired consumption good. There are two possibilities in market 3: (1) he
meets a producer who consumes good 1, so they will engage in barter exchange, or (2) he
meets a producer who consumes good 2 in market 3, so they trade if she is willing to accept
his good 1, otherwise no trade happens and he goes home.
In equation [1.8], V132 denotes the value function of an agent who produces good 1, desires
to consume good 3 and holds good 2. He has three strategies. If he stays at his own market
1, nothing happens because no one visits him. If he goes to market 2 to search, he incurs
a transport cost, but since no supplier of good 2 in market 2 will exchange for the good
2 he brought, nothing happens and he goes home. If he goes to market 3, he incurs the
same transport cost, but he will readily exchange because market 3 only sells his desired
consumption good. There are two possibilities in market 3: (1) he meets a producer who
consumes good 2, so they will engage in barter exchange; or (2) he meets a producer who
consumes good 1 in market 3, so they both trade if she is willing to accept his good 2,
otherwise no trade happens and he goes home. He gets the same payoff outcome as holding
good 1 entering market 3, since there will always be half of the people in market 3 who want
good 1 and half who want good 2.
V132 = max  {V132, c+ V132   c, c+ 1
2
(U +
1
2
(V131 + V121)) +
1
2
V132   c} (1.8)
In this case, it is optimal to stay home at his own market i because the expected utility
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gained is not greater than the expected transport costs.
Proposition 1.1. Everyone stays is a symmetric autarkic equilibrium iff U  4c.
The probability of getting the good you want and gaining the utility is half of U and the
search cost of moving back and forth of a market not of his own is 2c, hence the condition
U  4c. In the symmetric case, no one searches because the expected utility is no greater
than the expected cost of searching.
1.3.2 Asymmetric Case
In the asymmetric case, c1 < c2 < c3. The expected benefit at steady state is less than
the expected transport costs when he makes trips back and forth to visit a market twice.
From the assumption that c1 < c2 < c3, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. Everyone stays is an asymmetric autarkic equilibrium iff U  4c1.
The proof is straightforward for Proposition 1.2 and similar to Proposition1.1, thus the
proof is omitted. In both the asymmetric and symmetric cases, autarkic equilibrium may
exist. A high enough search cost c deters people from searching and, hence, trading.
1.4 Barter and Commodity Money
1.4.1 Symmetric Case
A perfect frictionless and complete barter economy with market clearance might occur
in a symmetric case, but it is very unlikely. There are two possible cases. To help explain,
I(i, j, k) denote agents who produce i, want to consume j, and hold k. In Figure 1.2, below,
the left, middle and right circles represent the markets of producers of types 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. Half of Type 1 producers want to consume good 2, shown by I(1, 2, 1), and the
other half want to consume good 3, shown by I(1, 3, 1), in the left circle in Figure 1.2. The
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Figure 1.2: Example of a perfect frictionless exchange where every agent engages in a suc-
cessful barter and the market clears.
same holds for Type 2 producers – half are I(2, 1, 2) and half are I(2, 3, 2), as shown in the
middle circle – as well as for Type 3 producers, as shown by the equal groups I(3, 1, 3) and
I(3, 2, 3) in the right circle.
Case 1: Suppose that all I(1, 3, 1) agents visit market 3 and all I(3, 1, 3) agents stay,
all I(3, 2, 3) agents visit market 2 and all I(2, 3, 2) agents stay, and all I(2, 1, 2) agents visit
market 1 and all I(1, 2, 1) agents stay. Then all agents would be perfectly matched to barter
in a frictionless environment and still achieve market clearance, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Case 2: Suppose that all I(1, 3, 1) agents stay and all I(3, 1, 3) agents visit market 1, all
I(3, 2, 3) stay and all I(2, 3, 2) agents visit market 3, and all I(2, 1, 2) agents stay and all
I(1, 2, 1) agents visit market 2. This is another possible case, but it is basically the opposite
direction of Case 1. Both cases may be possible if there is perfect coordination. With a
simultaneous stage game with “complete but imperfect" information, having perfect com-
munication is a necessary condition for perfect frictionless exchange. Complete information
means everyone knows the payoff and all the possible strategy profiles. Imperfect information
means no one knows the new draw for type from the taste shock.
Even with perfect information, there is a search cost to visit a market. The question
is: Which group would sacrifice to search to earn a lower payoff, and why? Since no agent
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Figure 1.3: Symmetric bartering exchange.
would sacrifice to have a lower payoff, then all agents prefer to stay.
The aforementioned frictionless exchange is a very restrictive case and is not a possible
equilibrium, given that no communication is assumed in this model. Some agents of the
group may choose to stay and search, this would lead to a non-cooperative environment as
described below.
A steady-state non-autarkic equilibrium exists, where all agents engage in trade and no
agent wants to deviate from it. My result, that the proportion of agents who search is slightly
less than half, differs from Goldberg’s (2007) finding of exactly half because of the transport
cost.
Agents have to be compensated for transport costs in the non-autarkic case. This is why
the proportion of agents who search will never be half in a steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 1.3. Given n = u 4c2u 4c , there exists a bartering mixed strategy equilibrium iff
U > 4c.
We can see from the result that if u = 4c, then n = 0. That is the corresponding autarkic
equilibrium where no one searches. If c = 0, then n = 12 , as shown in Figure 1.3 Half of
the population of each type searches and stays when there is no transport cost. Otherwise,
the proportion of agents who search is less than half to compensate for the lower payoff to
searching when tranport costs exist. When agents coordinate in such a way that slightly less
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than half of each of them searches, and the rest stay in their own market, this is a barter
equilibrium. Every searcher will be matched with at least one stayer, and it is optimal for
them to barter in the bilateral meetings. Contrary to Goldberg’s (2007) and KW’s results,
where the quid pro quo condition allows any commodity to become money in the symmetric
case, an equilibrium does not exist in the symmetric case for the direct search model. There
is no need to hold a certain commodity as a medium of exchange. In symmetric direct search,
agents are not better off holding goods (other than your own production), because the chance
you will encounter someone who wants to trade is the same. When an agent is indifferent,
nothing happens. Then no one would accept a good that is not his consumption good. Direct
money search for the symmetric case does not give rise to the quid pro quo structure; it is
not profitable to do so. Hence, commodity money does not arise in the symmetric case.
Proposition 1.4. A steady-state commodity monetary equilibrium does not exist in the
symmetric case.
Recall that there are two types of consumers in each market. For instance, half of the
suppliers (producer and holder) of good 1 in market 1 are Type 2 consumers, and the other
half are Type 3 consumers. If a Type 1 agent who holds good 2 wants to visit market 1, he
will have a one-half chance to be matched with someone in market 1 who wants to consume
good 2. If a Type 1 agent who holds good 3 wants to visit market 1, he will also have a
one-half chance to be matched with someone in market 1 who wants to consume good 3.
Regardless if a Type 1 agent holds good 2 or 3 when he enters market 1, the chance of
matching with someone who wants the good he brought is the same. Then, Type 1 who
holds good 3 will never trade with anyone for good 2 because it does not improve the chance
for a successful trade. Since this is a symmetric case, the payoff would be the same for a
Type 2 producer holding good 2 and a Type 3 producer holding good 3. Then no one would
accept another commodity as a medium of exchange. So, in the symmetric case, there is no
commodity monetary equilibrium.
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Figure 1.4: Asymmetric bartering exchange.
1.4.2 Asymmetric Case
In the asymmetric case, as predicted in KW and Goldberg (2007), it apears that the
commodity with the lowerst transport cost will emerge as the medium of exchange. Initially,
imagine that exactly half of each type of agent search for a good. The producer of good 1
has the initial advantage to establish his good as a medium of exchange because c1 is the
lowest transport cost. Later, in a steady state, when good 1 has been circulated as the
medium of exchange (until half of Type 2 and 3 producers hold good 1), Type 1 producers
no longer have the advantage of getting the good they want, relative to other producers. At
steady state, as shown in Figure 1.4, all Type 1 producers become searchers because good
1 is readily accepted in transactions, even if the trading partner does not consume good 1.
Half of Type 1 producers desire good 2 and will visit market 2 and the other half desire good
3 and will visit market 3. In the steady state, half of the Type 2 producers and half of the
Type 3 producers hold good 1 as a medium of exchange.
For Type 3 producers, half the agents hold good 3; a quarter stay and desire good 1 and
quarter stay and desire good 2, as shown by the two blue segments in Figure 1.4. They are
visited by twice as many visitors as themselves, so they conduct a lottery to see who gets
to meet a visitor. Since all visitors hold good 1, a quarter of Type 3 stayers who hold good
18
3 and desire good 2 will trade for good 1 and become good 1 holders in the next period. A
quarter of Type 3 stayers who desire good 1 will trade, consume it immediately, and draw a
new taste shock.
Half of Type 3 agents hold good 1 and desire good 2. They visit market 2 because
suppliers in market 2 will accept good 1. However, only half of Type 2 agents stay at market
2, and have twice as many visitors (half of Type 1 and Type 3 visitors holding good 1). Type
2 producers conduct a lottery to determine with whom they will trade, which means that
both Type 3 and Type 1 agents have half a chance to get their good. At the end, a quarter
of Type 3 searchers will get good 2, and nothing happens to the other quarter. At the end of
the period, half of Type 3 agents will hold good 1 and desire good 2. Another half of Type 3
agents will hold good 3; half of Type 3 agents who hold good 3 desire good 1 and the other
half desire good 2. The case is similar for Type 2 agents, so explanation is omitted.
Half of Type 1 searchers in market 2 must compete with Type 3 searchers. Type 1
searchers have half a chance of getting good 2 in market 2 at steady state. It is the same
case for Type 1 searchers in market 3. At the end of the period, only half of Type 1 agents
acquire their consumption good. This analysis shows that commodity money will arise in an
asymmetric case, but it neither improves nor worsens the matching probability. However,
Type 2 and Type 3 agents are better off because they are able to trade for a commodity
with a lower transport cost. Type 1 agents have the initial advantage of getting their desired
good. However, the advantage fades as the steady state is approached. Type 1 agents are
not better off than Type 2 and Type 3 agents in successful matching at steady state. Half of
each type will acquire their desired consumption in each period at steady state and no one
would deviate from this monetary equilibrium.
Proposition 1.5. A steady state commodity monetary equilibrium exists in the asymmetric
case.
Goldberg (2007) shows that money drives out bartering. However, this paper shows that
bartering can co-exist with commodity money. At steady state in each period, a quarter of
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Type 1 agents and one-eighth of Type 2 and Type 3 agents are barterers, while the remaining
agents are either a seller or buyer. This interesting result coincides with the intuition that
if a miner has gold and uses the gold to get the good he wants, and if his trading partner
wants to use the gold, they become barterers. The supplier of the commodity money will
have the chance to barter because he may meet someone who wants to trade for his good.
Proposition 1.6. The commodity with the lowest transport cost emerges as the commodity
money.
Hence a commodity with the lowest transport cost will be the preferred choice for com-
modity money.
Proposition 1.7. Bartering and commodity money coexist in equilibrium in the asymmetric
case.
Bartering and commodity money may co-exist in equilibrium in an environment without
fiat money. This result is interesting because it has not been shown in previous studies that
bartering can actually coexist with commodity money. The intuition is that there must be
a group of agents who produce a commodity that can be used as money. The producer of
this commodity money will have half a chance to meet with another agent who wants to
“literally" consume his good, so they would barter. He also has half a chance to meet with
another agent who does not want to consume his good but would accept it as a medium
of exchange because it has a lower transport cost. That is when the commodity becomes a
commodity money.
1.5 Fiat Money
In this section, fiat money is introduced into the model. It is indivisible (comes in units
of one) and searching with it incurs a transport cost c0   0. Initially, a fraction m 2 (0, 1)
of agents are endowed with money, not real goods. This paper only focuses on the analysis
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where fiat money crowds out other means of exchange. However the condition for fiat
money to be accepted as a medium of exchange in equilibrium is different for asymmetric
and symmetric cases. 1.8
Definition 1.2. In a fiat monetary equilibrium, fiat money is accepted as a medium of
exchange and agents never accept other goods except the good they want to consume.
This definition follows Goldberg (2007). The analysis here considers both asymmetric
and symmetric types of goods. Since direct search is used, there is no shopping or door-
to-door equilibrium like those discussed in Goldberg (2007). The fiat money works in both
asymmetric and symmetric cases.
1.5.1 Symmetric Case
Consider a symmetric fiat money equilibrium and a Type i agent who expects the fol-
lowing: all agents who hold their production goods go to their markets and agree to accept
only their desired consumption goods. In the symmetric case, fiat money is used to improve
trade because agents are willing to accept the fiat money, believing that the next agent he
meets will accept money to get the good he wants. The belief that the next agent he meets
will accept the money is due to the lower transport cost of fiat money. If the belief is true,
then the payoff is greater than the payoff of trying to barter with only half the chance of
getting the achieving double coincidence of wants. So the likelihood of the next agent being
willing to accept fiat money must exceed 12 . The expected utility would exceed the expected
utility from pure bartering. Since no one would accept any good as commodity money, the
introduction of fiat money could encourage trade due to its relatively lower transport cost,
and it would become a medium of exchange in the steady state. In the symmetric case, the
use of fiat money improves the chance of trade.
1.8There is no market to “sell" the money; basically you cannot be a stayer and a buyer at the same time.
Markets like “pawn shops", where searchers can bring a commodity to a market to exchange for money, do
not exist in this model. The purpose of having a marketplace in the model is to dedicate a place for selling
specific products.
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Proposition 1.8. A symmetric fiat monetary equilibrium exists iff c0 < ci where i = 1, 2, 3.
Since the use of commodity money does not exist in equilibrium in the symmetric case,
fiat money fills the void, serving as a medium of exchange to improve the chances of successful
trade. The introduction of fiat money crowds out pure bartering. This result corresponds
to Goldberg (2007) and KW.
1.5.2 Asymmetric Case
However, in the asymmetric case, the introduction of money does not improve the chance
of trade when compared to the use of commodity money. In the asymmetric case, fiat money
improves the payoff because it has a lower transport cost than goods 1, 2, and 3. Fiat money
does not improve the chance of trade, but it emerges as the medium of exchange because it
has a lower transport cost and this enables agents to achieve higher utility.
Proposition 1.9. An asymmetric fiat monetary equilibrium exists iff c0 < min{c1, c2, c3}.
With the introduction of fiat money, agents are not able to search for the good they want
with their own production commodity good. In asymmetric equilibrium, fiat money and
commodity money have slightly different implications. There is a tradeoff between the lower
chance of matching and the gain from lower transport costs. The chance of matching to get
the desired good is not higher for any agent when fiat money is introduced.
Without fiat money, all Type 1 agents are searchers in a commodity money environment.
However, only half of Type 1 agents are searchers with fiat money and they stop searching
with their production good once fiat money is introduced. This is because Type 2 and 3
agents are more willing to accept fiat money for the lower transport cost of fiat money, than
good 1 as commodity money. Due to the lower “saleability" of good 1 among Type 2 and
3 agents, Type 1 agents lose their “privilege" as a commodity money producer and have to
acquire fiat money as a medium of exchange in order to get the good they want.
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In a fiat money steady state, all types of agents who search will be matched and obtain
the good they want to consume. The fiat money equilibrium exists and there exists a unique
fraction of agents endowed with money m such that the expected utility of each agent is
maximized.
The results in this paper show that fiat money drives out both bartering and commodity
money, at the same time. This outcome has not been shown in previous papers. Gold-
berg (2007) shows that fiat money drives out commodity money, and KW show that fiat
money drives out bartering. Over time, fiat money does not promote more successful trading
among agents, on average, but fiat money exhibits second-order stochastic dominance over
commodity money in the asymmetric case or over pure bartering in the symmetric case.
1.6 Conclusion
The quid pro quo in non-direct money search models enables a commodity to become
a medium of exchange in the symmetric case. The equilibrium for commodity money in the
symmetric case does not exist in direct search. There is a steady state for people to search
for bartering. The introduction of fiat money deters people from bartering and there exists
a monetary equilibrium for fiat money. However, consideration of the symmetric case is
very specific. It would be interesting for future research to analyze the asymmetric case. It
is interesting that the introduction of fiat money does not improve the chance of trading
in the asymmetric case, because there could exist a commodity money. But this perhaps
depends the three-good case considered here. It would be interesting to see the results when
we extend the number of goods beyond three. This is an interesting historical issue because
the high transport cost of holding gold or silver coins prompted the early use of fiat money,
easily transported notes called “money" that were backed in gold.
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Chapter 2 :
Stability of Monetary Equilibrium in a
Direct Search Model
2.1 Introduction
Random-matching models, spawned from two seminal papers by Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989, 1993), have been common in the money search theory literature. Technical restrictions
in those models have drawn criticism. One criticism is the randomness in matching. As noted
by Howitt (2003), most people do not conduct their daily economic transactions in a random-
matching setting. Randomness in matching is unrealistic but has been maintained in the
models for tractability. Further developments in money search models have moved away
from random-matching towards more directed-matching. For example, Corbae, Temzelides
and Wright (2003) present a directed search model with a cooperative mechanism in an
exchange market, while Goldberg (2007) introduces partial directed money search in a fully
decentralized market.
For the analysis of monetary equilibrium, non-cooperative directed search is a more
realistic feature than partial directed or cooperative directed search. People normally visit
stores to get the goods they want without a third party coordinator. The entire search
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process is self-directed and each agent can generally reach the sellers of their desired good.
The non-cooperative directed search model of money introduced in this paper is similar to
the random money search model of Burdett, Coles, Kiyotaki and Wright (1995), henceforth
BCKW, except that people directly search and know which available goods other agents sell.
Ex-ante, there are many identical sellers of a good, so the searcher can either randomize
the choice of seller or revisit a known seller to obtain the desired good. Unlike in partial
directed search, a seller in non-cooperative directed search is always able to provide the good
whenever approached by a buyer.
The random-matching models generated from Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1993) framework
pose a technical challenge. An increasing number of good types, denoted k, will reduce the
expected utility with or without money in a random search model2.1. When k is sufficiently
large in a random search model, it will deter people from trade because the expected utility
diminishes. Even with the presence of money, people will not choose to trade when there is
a sufficiently large variety of goods because the expected utility diminishes as k increases.
In the random meeting money search model, the role of trade and money would disappear
and the expected utility approaches zero as k ! 1. In other random meeting papers
(e.g. BCKW), a higher k increases the likelihood of an autarkic equilibrium, even when
money is introduced, given that search cost is imposed. This means the variety of goods is
not always positively correlated to trade or to the role of money in the random-matching
setting. However, it conflicts with the general perception that people are not less willing to
hold money to trade when the variety of goods increases in the market. This paper shows
that this is not the case in a directed money search model: when k !1, the role of money
becomes more apparent. This occurs because k is not in the matching probability function
2.1In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), lim
k!1
rV1 =
 (1 M)
k(k   1) (U   ✏+ Vn   V1) +
 M
k
⇡(Vm   Vn   1) = 0 and
lim
k!1
rVm =
 (1 M)
k
⇧(U   ✏+ Vn   Vm) = 0 where V1, Vm and Vn are the value functions for not holding
money, holding money, and drawing a new preference shock. In the probability measure of k, the number
of desired good types being searched has to be infinitely many. Otherwise, if k is finite, this gives a zero
measure. In Kiyotaki and Wright (1993), @V1@k < 0 and
@Vm
@k < 0.
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with money holdings in the present direct search model.
When the information of the seller’s desire is absent, and the probability of a single
coincidence of want matching is low because k is sufficiently large, money plays a role to
facilitate exchange. This would be sufficient for money to appear as a medium of exchange.
When k ! 1, the cash-in-advance constraint framework is shown to be a very special
case of the money search framework. When there is a sufficiently large number of good
types, trading without money is not profitable because the possibility of barter is near zero,
so agents will only search for a good when they have money. The variety of goods is positively
correlated with trade with money, but negatively correlated with trade without money. No
agent will find it profitable to barter unless they have the cash in advance before searching for
a good. The cash-in-advance framework also proves to be a special case of the direct money
search framework, where k only needs to be sufficiently large that there exists a transaction
cost or search cost.
The model setup is described in the next section. In Section 3, I describe the decision
problem faced by an agent. The autarkic equilibrium is also described in Section 3. In
Section 4, a monetary equilibrium with directed search is presented. A comparison between
the random-matching model and directed search, in terms of the effect of k, is shown in
Section 5. A welfare comparison between random-matching and directed search is shown in
Section 6. In Section 7, I conclude and discuss further lines of research.
2.2 The Model
The environment used in this paper is a modified version of BCKW. They use random
matching, whereas a non-cooperative directed search framework is used in this paper.
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2.2.1 The Environment
A continuum of agents, i 2 [0, 1], live in discrete time with an infinite horizon and a
finite number of good types, k   3, where k is a finite integer. Each good is indivisible,
uniform in size and perishable at the end of each period. Each agent continues to specialize
in producing one unit of an agent-specific commodity good at the beginning of each period2.2
with a disutility (cost) of production, x. There are no production shocks, and each agent
can use his own production for consumption or possible bilateral exchange.
Each agent is a generalist in consumption and receives positive utility, u, by consuming
the type of good desired in that period, where u > x. Each agent is randomly assigned a
preference for the type of good he initially desires. If he happens to desire his own production
type, the agent will immediately consume it and draw a new preference. A new random
preference will be drawn at the end of the period only after the agent acquires the desired
good. Otherwise the agent will continue to desire the same type of good. If the agent
consumes a good not desired, his utility equals the disutility (cost) of producing a unit of
the good and it gives zero net utility2.3. An agent always consumes his own production
when there is no trade by the end of each period. The preference shocks are assumed to be
identically and independently drawn from a known uniform distribution of good types. The
preference drawn is private information known only to the agent, but his production type is
public information.
Money is indivisible, not perishable, cannot be produced and is randomly assigned ini-
tially to a fraction of agents, m. Each agent can only hold one unit of money balances.
A “non-moneyholder” possesses only one unit of a self-produced commodity good; a “mon-
eyholder” possesses one unit of money in addition to one unit of a commodity good2.4. A
2.2This feature of producing a good in every period is a closer fit to the non-monetary general equilibrium
model.
2.3This simplifies the model by ensuring that an agent will not receive any utility from consuming his own
production when he does not desire it.
2.4The setup in the conventional money search framework differs from this paper, where an agent expects
to produce in every period and is able to possess a unit of a good and money at the same time.
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non-moneyholder can only bring one unit of a commodity into the marketplace to trade;
whereas a moneyholder can bring one unit of money or one unit of a commodity, or both.
For each successful trade, both agents incur a transaction cost, ✏.
There are two decisions to make in every period: (i) search or stay, and (ii) reject or
accept trade. Both moneyholder and non-moneyholder can choose to search or stay. Each
agent chooses to search and trade only once and meets only one agent in a given period.
Otherwise, an agent has to wait for the next period to decide to search and trade again.
The trading decision is straightforward in the sense that an agent will only trade when he
finds the good he desires or when he is willing to exchange his production good for money.
Besides that, no agent would want to trade for a good he does not desire because each good
is perishable within the period and all agents exhibit self-interest; he would end up with
negative net utility from the trade due to the transaction cost. So, we focus more on the
decision to search or stay.
2.2.2 Search Process / Mechanisms
A moneyholder becomes a buyer when he exchanges his money for a good. A non-
moneyholder becomes a seller when he trades his good for money. Anyone becomes a
barterer whenever he swaps his good for another agent’s good. If an agent gets his desired
good, he consumes it immediately. All agents who search will return to their home at the
end of the period.
All sellers of the same type of production are located in a specific marketplace known to
all agents. The matching is endogenous such that the searcher self-directs exactly whom to
meet. However, the searcher does not know the seller’s desire. The information of the seller’s
desired good is revealed only after meeting. If an agent decides to search, he is assumed to
approach only a person who holds and owns the good he desires. So he know with certainty
who holds which goods, but he doesn’t know which good(s) those persons desire. When a
searcher arrives at a marketplace, the assumption of a continuum of agents means there are
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Agent
W1:non-moneyholder
S1:commoditystay
V1:commodity
search
1-m
Wm:moneyholder
Sm:commodity,money
stay
Vb:commodity,moneysearch
Vn:commodity
search
Vm :money
sea
rch
m
Figure 2.1: The roles and strategies of agents.
infinitely many identical sellers of the desired good type for potential trade2.5. A searcher
is indifferent about the identical sellers at the marketplace. Hence, a searcher is always
matched with a seller of the searcher’s desired good. The searcher knows his desired good
is available, but he does not know if one of the sellers will accept his offer2.6. This feature is
more realistic than the partial directed search: we normally have prior knowledge about a
seller’s available stock of the desired good when we want to make a purchase, but we don’t
always know what the seller desires in return.
Every meeting between agents in this exchange economy will produce either a single
coincidence of wants or double coincidence of wants. No coincidence of wants does not
happen because an agent always directs himself to the seller of his desired good in this
non-cooperative directed search2.7. Revisitation is permissible in this model, but has no
2.5This is a mathematical convenience to assume away the number of agents in matching as long as not all
agents are searching. The assumption of infinite agents is less realistic, but makes the model more tractable.
2.6Goldberg (2007) motivates the frictions in partially directed search with a probabilistic measure that a
searcher will acquire a good from a seller of his desired good. Unlike in Goldberg’s (2007) model, searchers
here also know which seller’s shop is open and has the capacity to supply the desired good.
2.7The absence of no coincidence of wants distinguishes this model from random-search or partially directed-
search models.
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measurable effect on payoffs. A searcher is indifferent between randomly picking or revisiting
a seller because there is no advantage to knowing the seller’s past desire from a bartering
exchange in the previous period2.8. A searcher without money can only barter and a searcher
with money can either barter or exchange with money if the seller is willing to accept.
On the other hand, the stayer cannot dictate who will visit him for an exchange. As a
stayer, you remain at your store to welcome traders at no cost. A stayer who does not hold
money can either barter or be a seller, and a stayer who holds money can only barter because
of the assumed degenerate distribution of money holdings. The stayer has the opportunity
to meet with those who are searching only for that specific good type. This is symmetric for
all other agents.
2.2.3 Value Functions and Equilibrium
The probability you will meet an agent who wants your good is 1k 1 , and the probability
that you would want his good is always 1 because you would only look for the good you
desire in this self-directed mechanism. The probability that a searcher would have the good
you desire is 1k 1 . Let m be the probability that you would meet with someone with money
and 1 m without money.
Let c1 and cm be the cost of searching and transport with commodity and with money,
where c1 > cm > 0. Assume that the cost of transport with money is zero, so cm is simply
the search cost2.9. The rate of time preference is r > 0, and ⇡ and ⇧ denote the best response
of an agent to accept money and the likelihood of acceptance of money by the other agent.
Let n1, nm, nb and ns be the proportions of non-moneyholders who search with a good,
moneyholders who prefer to search with money, moneyholders who search with both money
2.8Let a searcher who draws the same preference choose to revisit the same seller who previously bartered
with him. He may not be able to barter with the seller because the seller may desire a good other than the
searcher’s production good due to the seller’s preference shock. When the searcher draws the same preference
again and intends to barter with the same trader, the probability of a successful barter by revisiting a
previously traded seller is the same as a random pick for any other identical seller.
2.9Because the transport cost with money is zero, cm is the search cost, and so c1   cm is the transport
cost of a commodity.
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and commodity, and moneyholders who prefer to search with a good.
Let Wj denote the value function for an agent, where j 2 {1,m}; subscript 1 denotes
a non-moneyholder and subscript m denotes a moneyholder who holds a unit of money
and a unit of commodity. Vj and Sj denote the sub-value functions of a searcher and a
stayer, respectively. Vc and Vb are special cases for a moneyholder who prefers to search with
commodity only and with both money and commodity.
If the agent is a non-moneyholder, he chooses to search with commodity or stay at
steady-state, so as to maximize:
W1 =max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
V1 :search with commodity
,
n1(1 m)
r(k   1) U +
mnc
r(k   1)U +
mnb
r(k   1)U +max⇡ [⇡(
mnm
r
+
mnb
r
k   2
k   1)( x  ✏+Wm  W1)]| {z }
S1 :stay with commodity
}
(2.1)
where2.10 U = (u x)kk 1   ✏.
If the agent is a moneyholder, he chooses to search with money at steady-state, with
commodity, with money and commodity, or stay with money and commodity, so as to max-
2.10Similar to BCKW, if you draw a preference desiring your own good, you would consume it immediately
and then draw a new preference. The value function of drawing a preference desiring your own production
type, V0, is:
V0 = (u  x) + 1
k
V0 +
k   1
k
max{V1, S1}
=
k
k   1(u  x) +max{V1, S1}
u denotes the utlity in consuming one unit of desired good, and, U denotes the expected utility gained from
acquiring and consuming his desired good, including a draw to desire his own production type from a taste
shock.
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imize:
Wm =max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
Vc :search with commodity
,
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
  cm
r| {z }
Vb :search with money and commodity
,
n1(1 m) +m(nc + nb)
r(k   1) U| {z }
Sm :stay with money and commodity
}
(2.2)
An equilibrium is defined to be a Nash equilibrium such that each agent chooses the pure
and stationary strategy which maximizes his expected utility, contingent upon other agents’
strategies and the distributions of n1, nm, nb, ns resulting from the strategies chosen by other
agents.
Assumption 2.1. A continuum of agents means there are infinitely many identical sellers
of the desired good type for potential trade as long as the fraction of agents who search is not
equal to 1.
Assumption 2.2. u   x > c1 > cm > ✏ > 0.
Lemma 2.1. Vi, Si   0 for i 2 {1,m, c, b}.
Any strategy used must have a value greater than or equal to zero because an agent could
choose the strategy to consume his own production forever to have a zero expected utility.
2.3 Non-monetary Equilibrium
In this model, the friction of matching is due to incomplete information: not knowing the
desire of the seller. If knowledge of the seller’s desire can be easily acquired, money is not
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needed for the agents to perfectly coordinate. Hence, a non-monetary Walrasian equilibrium
could occur when everyone knows each seller’s desire.
Lacking information of the seller’s desire, there can be two possible non-monetary equi-
libria in a directed search money model. First, a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium could
exist when the searching strategies imply that no one is willing to search. Everyone stays,
and no trade occurs (similar to the results of Goldberg (2007) and BCKW).
Proposition 2.1. There exists a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium iff c1 > U(k 1) and cm >
⇧(1 m)[U + x].
This result appears to be consistent with the standard money search models: (i) a non-
monetary autarkic equilibrium exists when the cost of searching with a commodity and
money is higher than the possible gain from trade, (ii) no agent would want to search with
commodity when the variety of goods is sufficiently large which diminishes the utility gained
from trade, and (iii) no agent wanting to search with money depends on the probability of
money being accepted and the fraction of money supplied to agents in the market. This
makes the probability of meeting another agent willing to accept money low, making it un-
profitable to search with money and a commodity. When each agent believes that all agents
follow these strategies, his optimal strategy is to stay. Since no agent chooses to search, no
trade occurs. This is an interesting result, in that the threshold of searching with money is
independent of the number of good types.
Proposition 2.2. There exists a non-monetary barter equilibrium iff c1 < Uk 1 , with the
resulting distribution of n1 = 1  c1(k 1)u and cm > ⇧(1 m)[U + x].
When the number of good types is very low and the value of having money as a medium
of exchange is very small, a barter economy can emerge. This is consistent with a number
of observable cases. In ancient or primitive economies, where the variety of goods is limited
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and the number of traded goods is low, bartering tends to prevail. Similarly, even in more
modern war-torn economies, survival depends on fewer types of goods, primarily food and
shelter, increasing the reliance on barter transactions. Indeed, bouts of hyperinflation during
such periods might be viewed as efforts to flee from the use of money in favor of the direct
exchange of goods.
2.4 Monetary Equilibrium
A monetary equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with a list (W1,Wm) that satisfies the
incentive condition to hold money,  x  ✏+Wm  W1 > 0, such that the gain in accepting
money exceeds zero, given a stationary distribution of n1, nm, ns. Only the equilibria where
people accept money with probability ⇧ = ⇡ = 1 are considered.
There would exist a monetary equilibrium when agents get higher value by choosing
the strategy to accept money when the cost of searching is lower than the benefit of being
matched with the desired good in exchanging with money. The cost of searching with a
commodity must exceed the benefit of being matched in a bartering exchange, given the
utility in successfully acquiring the desired good and the probability of getting matched 1k 1 .
Proposition 2.3. There exists a monetary equilibrium if a moneyholder would not carry
only a commodity to search.
A moneyholder would not carry only a commodity to the market to search because this
implies a moneyholder chooses a strategy for which the payoff is the same as for a non-
moneyholder. No one would accept money if a non-moneyholder can be equally as well-off
as a moneyholder. If that is the case, monetary equilibrium does not exist. A moneyholder
who carries only a commodity to search implies that search with money is not profitable;
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this strategy is not possible in monetary equilibrium. It must be the case that searching
with money is profitable for a moneyholder; so this strategy of carrying only a commodity
to the marketplace is Pareto dominated in a monetary equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2. When an agent searches with money and a commodity, he will choose the
strategy to barter if possible; if not, then he would offer money in exchange for a good.
Proposition 2.4. In monetary equilibrium, a moneyholder would carry both money and a
commodity to search iff Uk 1 + cm < c1 <
1
k 1 [mU + (1 m)x] + cm, or there exists a k such
that Uc1 cm + 1 < k 
mU+(1 m)x
c1 cm + 1.
It would not be profitable for the moneyholder to search with money and a commodity
if the cost of carrying the commodity, c1   cm, exceeds the gain of engaging in barter with
a probability of 1k 1 . Searching with both will save on the search cost, since search cost is
incurred only once for each search, regardless if the agent carries money, a good, or both.
Proposition 2.5. In monetary equilibrium, a moneyholder would carry only money to search
iff c1 > 1k 1 [mU + (1   m)x] + cm or there exists a sufficiently large k such that k >
mU+(1 m)x
c1 cm + 1.
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5 show some numerical results for this model. For all numerical
results, we set r = 0.001,m = 0.5, c = 0.01, x = 0.1 and U = 1. Molico (2006), who provides
a good example of numerical analysis of a money search model, finds that r = 0.001 yields
an approximately normal distribution for money holdings and other key variables. In my
model, welfare is maximized when m is set to approximately 0.5, and the decision to set
U = 1 follows BCKW, mostly for reasons of tractability. The value c = 0.01 and x = 0.1 are
used to introduce a simple form of transaction and production costs to the model.
Figure 2.2 shows that the gain for accepting money in the random money search model
diminishes in k, as in BCKW. Note, however, that direct money search shows that the gain
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for accepting money monotonically increases in k. This is particularly important, in that it
conforms with economic intuition about the gain in accepting money being positively related
to the number of good types, k. The gain from searching with a commodity diminishes when
there are more type of goods in the market.
In a random search framework, the expected utility of a moneyholder and a barterer
in monetary and non-monetary equilibria approaches 0 when k approaches infinity. With
random money search, the likelihood of searching with money decreases because the expected
utility of accepting money decreases with an increasing number of good types, k. However,
in reality, the opposite seems to be more plausible: having more types of good to choose
from should not decrease the value of holding money. In the random search framework,
whether money is introduced or absent, the expected utility converges to zero as the number
of good types increases, implying that no one would trade and the system would converge
to an autarkic equilibrium.
Even given some search cost in random search2.11, there exists a sufficiently large k such
that the expected utility of a moneyholder and barterer will be zero. Hence, it would result
in autarkic equilibrium for any given value of m, c1, cm, r and x. It seems unrealistic that,
when the number of goods is large enough, no one will trade with or without money. For
example, we have a healthy monetary exchange economy with millions of types of good in
the world today.
In comparison, non-cooperative directed search presents a result closer to the general
economic intuition that the benefit of accepting money increases or at least does not dimin-
ish with k.
Proposition 2.6. When k !1, monetary equilibrium still exists and a moneyholder would
carry only money to search for any c1, cm, r,m > 0 and m, r 2 (0, 1).
2.11The traditional KW random search framework contains storage costs rather than search costs, while
BCKW use search cost in their money search model.
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Figure 2.3 shows different value functions for the directed money search model. The
value function for holding money and a commodity to search converges to a positive value as
k approaches infinity. The value function of searching with a commodity only quickly goes
to zero as k increases. This result has an interesting implication: agents will be unlikely
to search without money unless there are few good types in the market. The more good
types in the market the more likely the agents will search with money and commodities or
money alone. These intuitive results follow from the present direct search framework, but
contradict the earlier random search models.
Corollary 2.1. The cash-in-advance constraint framework is a (strict) special case of the
money search model with conditions that satisfy Proposition 2.5 (Proposition 2.6).
People will only search and buy when they have money in hand. This phenomenon
is equivalent to the cash-in-advance constraint framework. That being said, the cash-in-
advance framework can be regarded as a special case of the direct money search model,
where the agent would search only when they have the money (or cash) in hand when the
search cost is positive and k is large enough to deter search with a commodity, which appears
to be unprofitable. This implies that for any given parameter values, there exists a unique
solution to the equation for monetary equilibrium.
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2.5 Conclusion
People have different desires and needs at different times. Without perfect knowledge
of the seller’s desire, there exists a role for money in exchange, given a sufficiently large
number of good types. Compared to the the random search framework, directed money
search conforms better with basic economic intuition. The idea that random search becomes
infeasible with a sufficiently large number of goods is particularly troubling. The inefficiency
of bartering due to low probability of matching depends on the large number of good types.
In the directed money search model presented here, monetary equilibrium can be satisfied
with increasingly large k. In addition, the value of accepting money is at least non-decreasing
when the number good types increases. Generally, the variety of goods is positively correlated
with trade with money, however, random matching in money search models leads to a nega-
tive correlation. Given these technical challenges, there must exist other reasons to proceed
with the equivalent class of random money search models. The use of random money search
may be applicable to specific cases, but non-cooperative directed money search appears to
be a useful alternative.
By focusing on the number of types of goods in a directed money search model, this paper
offers a novel connection between two well-known frameworks, the cash-in-advance frame-
work and the money search framework. This connection may serve as a starting point for
intuitively understanding both frameworks and combining their features to improve the tools
of monetary policy analysis. In this regard, future research should extend the integration of
cash-in-advance models with money search models.
In closing, I would like to highlight a point that has not discussed so far. There could
be more than one variable which affects the exchangeability between money and good.The
number of good types (k) just one of the possible variables that influences the use of money.
However, finding a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the demand for money when
there exists an alternative medium of exchange, other than bartering, remains unresolved in
this paper.
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Figure 2.2: A comparison of utility gained in accepting money between random and directed
money search frameworks, where k denotes the number of good types.
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Figure 2.3: Expected utility for different searching strategies of a moneyholder at steady
state in non-cooperative directed money search, where k denotes the number of good types.
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Figure 2.4: Expected utility at steady state for value functions in non-cooperative directed
money search, where k denotes the number of good types.
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Table 2.1: A table showing the sensitivity analysis for the expected utility of holding money
with different paramater values for r, m, c1, cm and x.
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Chapter 3 :
Money for Market Clearance in
Decentralized Markets
3.1 Introduction
General equilibrium models typically involve decentralized decision-making with a
centralized clearing mechanism, employing an imaginary “Walrasian auctioneer" to do com-
plex computations for market clearing. With imperfect information and no transaction costs,
money assumes a role equivalent to the imaginary Walrasian auctioneer, so that each market
attains zero excess demand within one period, even when friction arises.
In this chapter, I introduce a model with fully decentralized markets that can potentially
clear within each period, an alternative to Lagos and Wright’s (2005) model. The desirable
feature of market clearing within a period also ensures that markets clear in subsequent peri-
ods. The results correspond to Kiyotaki and Wright’s (1993) model, except agents are more
likely to accept money when the number of types of goods is infinite. Not only does money,
as a medium of exchange, facilitate successful transactions among individuals, but it also
serves as an important and necessary instrument to assist market clearance in decentralized
markets when frictions arise. Without money, when the number of types of good exceeds
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two, the market is impossible to clear when there is imperfect information among agents.
Even though introduction of the market improves on successful trade, it cannot completely
overcome the search friction.
Since the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993), there have been successful
efforts to explicitly incorporate money as a medium of exchange in economic models using
search theory. However, most of the first and second-generation money search models do
not achieve market clearing within a period. The idea that the market clears within one
period is important because it ensures that markets can potentially clear in any subsequent
periods. This is also true for the Arrow-Debreu model of market clearance within one period.
It later extends to sequential equilibrium in a dynamic model, where each market clears with
a perfect relative price mechanism. From sequential equilibrium, many policy issues can be
analyzed and explored. However, if a money search model can be developed with similar
properties, we can potentially have an integrative model where good markets clear within a
competitive decentralized market mechanism and money serves as the medium of exchange
that facilitates market clearance.
Third generation money search models begin to feature market clearance within one
period, starting with a paper by Lagos and Wright (2005)3.1. In their paper, each period
is cleverly divided into two sub-periods: one is decentralized and the other is centralized.
The search mechanism is incorporated in the decentralized market and a market-clearing
mechanism is used in the centralized market. This approach has some weaknesses. For
example, in their model, market clearance is not in the market where money matters. Money
is used to overcome the search frictions in the decentralized market, but money is pre-
conditioned for acceptance in the centralized market for clearance purposes. This downplays
another important role of money as an instrument to clear the market.
This paper investigates two aspects of money. First, can fully decentralized good markets
3.1Lagos and Wright (2005) also contribute by introducing divisibility for goods and money, and introducing
sub-periods, where one of the markets in a sub-period is decentralized and exchange involves Nash bargaining
as a solution.
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with frictions use money to achieve market clearance? Second, this paper investigates if
money plays an instrumental role in clearing the market within a period. Third, do markets
need money to function, or is money a necessary condition for the existence of markets?
Kultti (1994) shows that agents are able to achieve economic efficiency with money as a
pre-condition for the existence of markets. I show here that markets can exist before money;
we called those markets barter markets. I also show that money is a necessary tool to achieve
market clearance when the number good types is greater than 2. Without money, market
clearance is hard to achieve, due to imperfect information.
In this model, we are not concerned about whether agents want to search or stay, or their
choice of which market to visit. For that, see the second chapter of this dissertation and
BCKW. In this chapter, we only investigate monetary equilibrium, where money is accepted
as a medium of exchange, and how money is crucial in clearing decentralized markets for
goods.
3.2 Model
This model consists of N infinitely-lived agents with specialized production and gener-
alized consumption, where N is an infinitely-large number. The goods in production and
consumption are indivisible and called real commodities, as in KW. The setK {k 2 K : k   2
and k 2 N} represents the types of goods and 1k denotes the equal proportion of agents who
will consume that type of good3.2.
Market clearance in this paper requires that each agent gets his desired good in exchange
for one unit of his own production. Each period has two sub-periods, as in Lagos and Wright
(2004). The critical difference between our models is that markets in both sub-periods are
decentralized in my model. Initially, regardless of type, agents are randomly assigned and
grouped in equal proportion into two categories: (i) searchers and (ii) stayers. An agent
3.2This notation 1k corresponds to x in KW’s paper.
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whose turn it is to search is called a searcher, and an agent whose turn it is to stay is called
a stayer. As depicted in Figure 3.1, a searcher in the first sub-period becomes a stayer in
the second sub-period, and a stayer in the first sub-period becomes a searcher in the second
sub-period. Subsequently, stayers and searchers will alternate their roles in each sub-period,
so there are always fixed and equal shares of searchers and stayers in every sub-period.
Consider a market where people coordinate such that there are equal proportions of
searchers and stayers at steady state.3.3 Imagine a world where people work on a given
schedule to indirectly coordinate the search process, such that whoever stays to offer a good
or service to trade gets visited by a searcher. Each sub-period is a decentralized market
where agents can directly search for the good they want.3.4 The commodity goods being
produced by everyone are agent-specific and fixed, and this is public information. Everyone
knows the quantity of money in the economy. Everyone can produce only once in each
period and must consume a good in order to produce. Whenever an agent does not hold his
production good and has acquired the good he wants, he will exit the market immediately
and rejoin the market in the next period.
In the model, there are organized markets for each type of good. The type of consumption
good that an agent wants is private information, only known by him and revealed to those
who have visited him or to the person he visits. After acquiring the good he wants to
consume, he will consume it immediately and draw a new taste shock for the next sub-
period. Each searcher can visit the exact market that sells the good he wants to consume.
After meeting with a stayer and trading with the stayer, he knows the good the stayer wants
to consume in that period. He can choose to visit him again in the next sub-period if he
happens to draw a taste shock for the same type of good again. However, the stayer may
have drawn a different type of good that he wants to consume in the next sub-period. Hence,
3.3This is a pre-condition which ensures that we are not addressing who is searching or staying and the
matches between searchers and stayers are always complete.
3.4Unlike Lagos and Wright’s (2003) model, where the first sub-period is decentralized but the second is
decentralized, this paper presents a model with market clearing in a decentralized search market within a
period.
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the absence of double coincidence of wants may occur because the stayer may not want to
consume the same good from the previous sub-period, and thus may not trade with the
same good that he brought. The only way the same stayer wants the good that the searcher
brought in the next sub-period is if and only if the stayer failed to get and consume the good
he wants.
Figure 3.1: A diagram showing the role of agents and the strategies for each sub-period
within periods t  1, t, and t+ 1.
3.3 Barter and Market
In this section, each agent produces one unit of a type-specific commodity good. Initially,
each agent only holds one unit of a commodity good they produce. There are two assigned
groups: searchers and stayers. Trade between any two agents is mutual. If an agent is
offered the good he wants to consume, he will be ready to accept it. They trade if and
only if the outcome benefits both; or in this case, if both want the good offered they barter.
Otherwise, they part. When they barter, the stayer and searcher each get the good they
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want to consume. After a successful bartering, both agents will exit the market and return
in the next period to the market.
In this section, each agent only has one unit of a commodity good. They produce one
unit of a type-specific commodity good. There are two assigned groups: searchers and
stayers. Trade between two agents is mutual when they meet and they trade if and if only
the outcome benefits both; otherwise, they part. If an agent is offered the good he wants to
consume, he will definitely agree to exchange, or in this case, if both want the good offered
they barter. After a successful bartering, both agents will exit the markets and will come
back in the next period. When they barter, the stayer and searcher get the good they want
to consume.
The value functions for the searcher (V1) and stayer (S1) are as follows:
V1 =  [
1
k   1(u+ V1   S1) + S1] (3.1)
S1 =
u
k   1 + V1 (3.2)
V1 is the value function for a searcher with a commodity in the first sub-period where he
gains utility u when matched with someone who holds the good he wants with probability 1k 1
and will exit the market to become a searcher in the next period, V1 with discount rate,  .
If the searcher barters and get his good, he will not participate in the next sub-period and
will wait until the end of a period to consume his good, and will then become a searcher
again. If the searcher does not find the good he wants to consume, he will engage as a stayer
(S1) in a new search in the second sub-period.
S1 is the value function for a stayer with a commodity in the second sub-period where
he gains utility u when matched with probability 1k 1 and he becomes a searcher with a
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commodity in the next first sub-period. Manipulating the Equations [3.1]-[3.2] gives
rV1 =
2k   3
(k   1)2u (3.3)
The equation above denotes the expected utility for an agent initially assigned to be
searcher in a non-monetary environment, where r is the time preference rate. Now consider
the other group of agents who initially are assigned to be stayers.
X1 =  [
1
k   1(u+X1  W1) +W1] (3.4)
W1 =
u
k   1 +X1 (3.5)
X1 is the value function for a stayer with a commodity in the first sub-period, where he
gains utility u when matched with someone who holds the good he wants with probability
1
k 1 and becomes a stayer with a commodity in the next period with discount rate  . If a
stayer barters and gets his good, he would not participate in a search in the next sub-period,
but waits until the end of the period to consume his good, and then becomes a stayer again.
If the stayer does not find the good he wants to consume, he will engage in a new search
in the second sub-period. W1 is the value function for a searcher with a commodity in the
second sub-period, where he gains utility u when matched with probability 1k 1 and becomes
a stayer with commodity in the next first sub-period.
Solving Equations [3.4] and [3.5] gives the following expression:
rX1 =
(2k   3)
(k   1)2 u (3.6)
The equation above denotes the expected utility for agents initially assigned to be a stayer
in a non-monetary environment, where r is the time preference rate. Money is not essential
for a market to exist. Unlike Kultti (1995), who shows that introducing money enables the
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formation of a market, implying that markets can only function when money exists, I show
this is not necessarily the case. The preceding equation shows that a market can form and
operate without the need for money. Without money, barter markets can exist and trade can
still be conducted. There are examples of barter markets in the real world, even in modern
economies, as described by Dalton (1982) and Argumedo and Pimbert (2010).
In this paper, I show that a barter market can exist without money, and money does not
replace the role of the market. The question of which good becomes commodity money and
the adoption of fiat money are not issues to be addressed here.3.5
Although people can achieve better trade outcomes with a market, even without the use
of money, the good market gets harder to clear when market friction arises as the number of
types of goods increases. Without the use of money, people will only find a successful match
to barter, with probability 2k 3(k 1)2 within a period. without the use of money. Let’s say there
are N agents in the market where N > nk such that n > n0 and n0 is some large integer,
then:
NX
i=1
(2k   3)
(k   1)2 1i 
NX
y=1
1y (3.7)
In the above inequality, the term on the left denotes the quantity demanded that is
acquired from successful bartering, and the term on the right is the total quantity supplied
within a period.3.6. In a non-monetary environment, the market cannot clear at all when
k > 2. Let B = (2k 3)(k 1)2
NX
n=1
1i, then we have @B@k < 0 and limk!1B = 0 . The market gets
more difficult to clear as the number of goods increases. In fact, the market can only fully
clear when k = 2. Without the use of money, decentralized markets make it impossible to
3.5Search costs are used in the money search model to give rise to the choice of money. In this model,
I focus on the question of whether a barter market can exist with or without money, so search costs are
omitted for parsimony without much affecting the results. Search costs are more important when we address
questions about the emergence of commodity money or location strategies.
3.6In this model, we only compare quantity demanded with quantity supplied, rather than with the quantity
produced in a period, because Walrasian market clearance requires that the quantity demanded equals the
quantity supplied. However, the set-up can be modified to also account for quantity produced without
affecting the major findings.
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achieve Walrasian market clearance for any k > 2. In the next section, money is a necessary
tool to achieve market clearance within one-period.
3.4 Monetary Equilibrium
We focus only on monetary equilibrium at steady state, where agents accept money
as a medium of exchange. Money is introduced into the model in this section as a token that
is indivisible, intrinsically worthless and inconvertible. Each monetary token is tradable for
a one-to-one swap with any real commodity. Each agent can only hold at most one unit of
money or commodity at a time. Initially, only a portion m of the agents are endowed with
one unit of money, where 0 < m < 1.
As in Figure 3.1, a searcher and stayer can either be a money-holder or a non-money-
holder. Every agent maximizes his expected utility by choosing whether or not to accept
money as a medium of exchange to achieve a trade. If a stayer does not have money, he
can choose to accept money as a medium of exchange in return for his commodity good, or
he can reject and nothing happens. If a stayer holds money, he cannot sell it, because the
market is only meant for selling goods; he can only wait for the next sub-period to search
with money.
A money-holder is someone who holds one unit of money, and a commodity holder is
someone who holds one unit of a good. Every agent holds either one unit of a good or money
at any time. Townsend’s (1998) turnpike model restricts money to be the sole medium to
achieve successful trade. His concept of alternating the fixed role of agents is similar to this
model, except that the present model allows another alternative: a decision to barter to
achieve successful trade. Initially, a fraction 1 m of the agents are endowed with a unit of
money. The arrival rate is normalized to 1 to simplify the exposition without affecting the
equilibrium outcomes.
The setup remains the same, where the population is divided into two equal groups: one
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is a group of searchers and the other is a group of stayers in the first sub-period. There are
four value functions for agents from the two groups. The first two value functions are for
first sub-period searchers who are money-holders (Vm) or commodity-holders (V1):
Vm =  [(1 mx)⇧(u+ S1   Sm) + Sm] (3.8)
V1 =  [(1 mx) 1
k   1(u+ V1   S1) + S1] (3.9)
Vm denotes the value function for a searcher who holds money in the first sub-period,
with a discount rate  , times the probability (1 mx) of meeting a stayer who is not a money
holder and the probability (⇧) that the stayer accepts money, after which the searcher gains
utility u from consumption. After consuming the good, he produces a unit of good and
will join the second sub-period as a stayer holding a commodity that he hopes to exchange
for money from a searcher, so that he can become a searcher holding money in the next
sub-period. If he does not exchange to get the good he wants, he will become a stayer with
money (Sm) in the second sub-period.
V1 denotes the value function for a searcher who holds one unit of commodity in the first
sub-period with a discount rate  and the probability (1   mx) of meeting a stayer who is
not a money holder and the probability 1k 1 of meeting a stayer who is not a money holder
and the utiity u from consumption. He will also exit the market after consumption to wait
until the end of the period to produce a unit of good to become a stayer with commodity
(S1) in the second sub-period.3.7
Sm = Vm (3.10)
3.7Note: There is no discount rate   for Equations 3.10 and 3.11 because both value functions denote the
second sub-periods. The discount rate is only applied to inter-period, not across subperiods within a period.
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S1 = (1 mw)[ u
k   1 + V1   Vm] + Vm (3.11)
Sm denotes the value function for a stayer holding money in the second sub-period who
becomes a searcher with money (Wm) in the next first period. A stayer holding money in the
second sub-period will not be able to trade with anyone because he cannot go to his good
market to sell his money. Each good market is restricted to selling a specific type of good.
S1 denotes the value function for a stayer holding a commodity in the second sub-period,
with probability (1 mw) of meeting a searcher who is not a money holder and probability
1
k 1 that he would want the good brought by the searcher, after which he gains utility u
from consuming it. If the stayer fails to meet a searcher who has the good he wants, they
part and the stayer becomes a searcher holding commodity (V1) in the next first sub-period.
With probability mw, he meets a searcher with money who wants to buy his good. If he
accepts the money in exchange for his good, he will become a searcher holding money (Vm)
in the next first sub-period.
Xm =  Wm (3.12)
X1 =  [(1 mv) 1
k   1(u+X1  W1) +mv(Wm  W1) +Wm] (3.13)
Xm denotes the value function for a stayer holding money in the first sub-period, given
by the discount rate   times Wm, the value of becoming a searcher with money in the second
subperiod. As a stayer holding money in the first sub-period, he will not be able to trade
with anyone, because he cannot go to his good market to “sell" his money (same as trading
his money for a good at his own market), as in 3.10. Each good market is restricted to selling
a specific type of good.
X1 denotes the value function for a stayer holding a commodity in the first sub-period,
given by the discount rate   times the probability (1 mv) of meeting a searcher who is not a
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money holder and the probability 1k 1 that he would want the good brought by the searcher,
after which he gains utility u from consuming it. If he does not meet a searcher who has the
good he wants, they part and he becomes a searcher W1 holding a commodity, similar to
S1. With probability mv, he meets a searcher with money who wants to buy his good. If he
accepts the money in exchange for his good, he will become a searcher Wm holding money
in the second sub-period.
Wm = (1 ms)⇧(u+X1  Xm) +Xm (3.14)
W1 = (1 ms) u
k   1 +X1 (3.15)
Wm denotes the value function for a searcher holding money in the second sub-period
with probability (1 ms) of meeting a stayer who is not a money holder and probability ⇧
that the stayer accepts money, after which the searcher gains utility u from consumption.
After consuming the good, he produces a unit of good and will join the next first sub-period
as a stayer X1 holding a commodity that he hopes to exchange for money from a searcher,
allowing him to become a searcher holding money in the next second sub-period. If he cannot
exchange to get the good he wants, he will remain a stayer Xm holding money in the next
first sub-period.
W1 denotes the value function for a searcher holding money in the second sub-period with
probability (1   ms) of meeting a stayer who is not a money holder and with probability
1
k 1 that the stayer wants the good he brought, after which they engage in a barter and he
gains utility u from consumption. After consuming the good, he produces a unit of good
and will join the next first sub-period as a stayer holding a commodity. There is no market
for money, so he can only barter in this situation. If he did not exchange to get the good he
wants, he will continue to be a stayer holding a commodity in the next first sub-period.
The definition of monetary equilibrium in this paper is a steady-state search equilibrium
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denoted by the value functions (Vm, Sm,Wm, Xm, V1, S1,W1, X1), money supply m and a
distribution of agents (mw,mx,ms,mv) in the market that satisfies the incentive to hold
money: max{Vm, Sm} > max{V1, S1} and max{Wm, Xm} > max{W1, X1}.
To ensure that monetary equilibrium exists, the best response for a non-money holder
stayer to accept money as a medium of exchange is when a searcher finds that it is more
profitable holding money than holding a commodity in the next sub-period, (Vm   V1 > 0).
Solving the incentive constraint with Equations [3.8]- [3.11], gives:
⇧ >
(k   2 +mw) + (k   1)(1 mw)
(k   1)(k  mw) (3.16)
At steady-state, with optimal money supply m = .5 and the distribution mw = 1 and
mx = 0, the best response for a monetary equilibrium to accept money as a medium of
exchange can be simplified at steady-state to:
⇧ >
1
k   1 (3.17)
This result is the same as in BCKW. It means that the acceptability of money as a
best response strategy holds when the probability of finding someone who will accept money
as a medium of payment exceeds the probability of finding someone who wants your good
to engage in a barter. Now, we look at the group who is assigned as stayers in the first
sub-period.
To show the existence of monetary equilibrium, there must exist be incentive for an
agent to accept money because it gives a higher utility. Using equations (3.12)-(3.15) in the
inequality Wm > W1 and solving for ⇧ gives:
⇧ >
 (1 mv)(k   2 ms) + (k   1)(1 ms)
(1 ms)[(k   1)2 +  (1 mv)(k   2 ms)] (3.18)
At steady state, with optimal money supply m = .5 and the distribution ms = 0 and
mv = 1, a stayer will choose to accept money as a best response strategy in monetary
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equilibrium if:
⇧ >
1
k   1 (3.19)
Intuitively, a stayer will accept money as a medium of exchange when the expected value
of meeting a non-moneyholder stayer who is willing to accept money is higher than the
expected value of meeting someone who would want to consume the good he brought. The
results here correspond to KW in that ⇧ is dependent on k. Both searcher and stayer have
the same result in monetary equilibrium at steady state. However, when the set of k goods
becomes infinitely large in KW or BCKW, the monetary equilibrium does not hold because
it does not satisfy the condition to be a medium of exchange, as shown in the second chapter
of my dissertation.
In monetary equilibrium with m = .5, which results in (ms,mv,mw,mx) = (0, 1, 1, 0) at
steady state, the value function for the agents of both groups can be simplified to:
rVm = u (3.20)
rX1 = u (3.21)
This interesting outcome has not been shown in previous studies. It says that if you
are a searcher or stayer, or if you are a buyer or seller, the expected utility within a period
is symmetric. Essentially this shows that any agent is indifferent in choosing to become a
searcher or seller in a symmetric setup.
NX
i=1
1i =
NX
y=1
1y (3.22)
In equation [3.22],the left-hand side denotes the quantity of acquired good that they want
(or acquired quantity demanded) from successful trade with the use of money, and the right-
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hand side denotes the total quantity supplied within a period. In this period, if everyone
chooses to accept money as the medium of exchange, it ensures that everyone is able to obtain
the good they want to consume in every period in steady state. Everyone produces one unit
of output and is able to exchange for one unit of consumption good in a totally decentralized
market. Since this model only focuses on good frictions and the price is assumed to be fixed,
market clearance means that every unit of production is being consumed at steady state,
given optimal money supply. An optimal money supply means the fraction of m that gives
the first-best expected utility. It also means each agent is being matched to get the good
they want to consume within a period. This would satisfy Walrasian equilibrium in that the
market potentially clears with the use of money. Since the market clears in one-period, it
can be easily shown that the market potentially clears in all subsequent periods with the
introduction of money.
Proposition 3.1. Given imperfect information, money is necessary for market clearing to
achieve Walrasian equilibrium when k > 2.
Without money, an agent matching to achieve a successful barter is inversely proportional
to the variety of goods. The larger the variety of goods, the less likely an agent will be
matched with the good they want, as depicted in Figure 3.2. With the introduction of
money, an agent chooses the strategy to accept money to improve the chance of acquiring
the desired good; otherwise they would have a lower probability of getting the good. Any
deviation from the equilibrium path results in a lower chance for an agent to get the good
they want and, hence, lower expected utility. In each sub-period, there are agents who stay
and choose to accept money in exchange for their production good and agents, or buyers, who
trust and hold money as an instrument of exchange to get the good they want. Otherwise,
in a non-monetary economy, people will have difficulty finding a match to exchange for the
good they want. Thus, markets will be very difficult to clear in a non-monetary economy.
Money is crucial in assisting markets to clear.
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3.5 Conclusion
Moving away from the traditional setup with perfect information, where a Walrasian
auctioneer clears the market, money is a necessary instrument to coordinate market clearing
in a decentralized market system with imperfect information. The analysis also shows that
markets can function without money where people can barter when they meet at a market.
Nonetheless, money helps to improve successful trade with markets.
However, if the number of types of good exceeds two, the use of money is necessary
for markets to clear within one period and in all subsequent periods. The proposed model
shows that in a simple world with one fixed price, money is essential to achieve Walrasian
equilibrium. Inclusion of an aggregate price mechanism in this model could potentially
represent significant progress toward an integration of money search and general equilibrium
models.
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Figure 3.2: The effect of k on market clearance in a monetized market and a bartering
market, where k denotes the number of good types.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proofs for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1.1. There is no search or storage cost to stay at his own market (or stay
home). He can always choose the strategy to stay home which has a lower bound of zero
utility if no one visits his market . This lemma is the same as in Goldberg’s (2007) Lemma
1. If visiting other markets will result in negative outcomes, he can always choose not to
visit other markets and get zero utility.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. We solve the equilibrium by tracing backward. Between choosing
V131 and V132 in market 2, he would not choose to trade for good 2 with his good 1 when
he is indifferent, since he does not gain in expected utility for trading in good 1. Evaluating
agent 3 in market 3, agent 3 who consumes good 2 will not want to exchange with agent 1
because V323   V321 in a symmetric case. This makes ⇧3 = 0. This simplifies the equation
to:
V131 = max  {0, c+ 1
2
(V131) +
1
2
V131   c, c+ 1
2
(U +
1
2
(V131 + V121)) +
1
2
V131   c} (A.1)
V131 = max  {0, 2c, 2c+ 1
2
(U +
1
2
(V131 + V121)) +
1
2
V131} (A.2)
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V132 = max  {V132, c+ V132   c, c+ 1
2
(U +
1
2
(V131 + V121)) +
1
2
V132   c} (A.3)
From the equations above, V132   V131 = 0, then V132 = V131. Hence the agent will not
accept the trade of commodity 1 for commodity 2.
V121 = max  {V121, c+1
2
(V121)+
1
2
max{V121, V123} c, c+1
2
(U+
1
2
(V131+V121))+
1
2
V121 c}
(A.4)
V121 = max  {0, 2c, 2c+ 1
2
(U +
1
2
(V131 + V121)) +
1
2
V121} (A.5)
V121 = max  {0, 2c, 2c+ 1
2
(U + V121)} (A.6)
It is easy to show that V131 = V121. So, solving these equations and simplifying them
gives:
V131 = V121 = max  {0, 2c, 2c+ 1
2
U} (A.7)
He chooses to stay at his own market if and only if U  4c. It is optimal to stay
home/stay at his own market i because the expected utility gained is not greater than the
expected transport costs.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Refer to the text.
Proof ofProposition 1.3. In the symmetric case, we know that neither all agents search or
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all agents stay. Some agents will search, and some agents will stay. So,
Viji = rmax[↵ii(
1
2
(u+
1
2
(Viji + Viki)  Viji)), 2ci + ↵ij(1
2
(u+
1
2
(Viji + Viki)  Viji)),
  2ci + ↵ik max{Viji, Vijk}  Viji]
(A.8)
Vijk = rmax[Vijk, 2ci + ↵ij max{Viji, Vijk}  Vijki, 2ci + ↵ik(1
2
(u+
1
2
(Viji + Viki)  Vijk))]
(A.9)
Viki = rmax[↵ii(
1
2
(u+
1
2
(Viji + Viki)  Viji)), 2ci + ↵ij max{Viji, Vijk}  Viki,
  2ci + ↵ik(1
2
(u+
1
2
(Viji + Viki)  Viki))]
(A.10)
From Viji   Viki = 0, then Viji = Viki. This simplifies the above equations to:
Viji = rmax[↵ii
u
2
, 2ci + ↵ij u
2
, 2ci + ↵ik max{Viji, Vijk}  Viji] (A.11)
Vijk = rmax[0, 2ci + ↵ij u
2
, 2ci + ↵ik max{Viji, Vijk}  Vijk] (A.12)
Viki = rmax[↵ii
u
2
, 2ci + ↵ij max{Viji, Vijk}  Viki, 2ci + ↵iku
2
] (A.13)
If an agent wants to exchange for commodity k with commodity i, he would not exchange
for commodity i with commodity k when he visits market k. For an agent who produces i
and desires j, but holds k, it must be the case that Vijk > Viji. Otherwise he would not
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exchange them in the first place if we assume that agent is rational. This implies that:
Vijk = rmax[0, 2ci + ↵ij u
2
, 2ci] (A.14)
Since Vijk  Viji, an agent does not trade commodity i for k since we assume no trade if
agents are indifferent due to transaction cost. This further simplifies Equation A.11 to:
Viji = rmax[↵ii
u
2
, 2ci + ↵ij u
2
, 2ci] (A.15)
An agent who produces i, desires j, and holds i will not visit market k because of a lower
payoff. To show that there is a bartering equilibrium, it must be the case that some agents
would search and some would stay. So he would either stay or visit market j. In steady
state, ↵ii = nj+nk2(1 ni) and ↵ij = 1.
↵ii
u
2 =  2ci + ↵ij u2 =) ↵ii   ↵ij =  4ciu =) nj+nk2(1 ni)   1 =  4ciu
In the symmetric case, all agents will have the same payoff and choose the strategy
identically and independently. So, n1 = n2 = n3 = n.
2n
2(1 n)   1 =  4ciu =) 4n 22(1 n) =  4ciu =) n =
1  4ciu
2  4ciu
=) n = u 4ci2u 4ci
Since this is a symmetric case, all other agents’ strategies will be the same since they
are all identical. Thus there is an equilibrium when they are indifferent between staying or
visiting market j, given that n = u 4ci2u 4ci , such that n fraction of agents search for each type
of agents.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. From Proposition 1.3, we know that Vijk  Viji, an agent does
not trade commodity i for k since we assume no trade if agents are indifferent due to the
transaction cost. An agent will not trade for a commodity he does not want to consume. This
is because holding commodity k is as likely to get the good he desires as with commodity
j. There is no improvement in the chance of getting the good he desires. He does not trade
when he is indifferent due to the transaction cost. So he would not accept a good he does
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not desire, hence the role of a commodity as a medium of exchange does not arise.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. In the asymmetric case with common knowledge and complete
information, first, we check at the initial state on who would accept a good he does not
consume. Suppose initially no one would accept any good other than the good they want
to consume, then we would have ⇧ij = 0 for all i, j. There would be some agents from each
type who search when U > 4c, where c = max{c1, c2, c3}. First, we check with agent 2
holding good 2,
rV233 =  2c2 + ↵23 1  n23
2  n23   n13
✓
u+ c2 +
1
2
(V232 + V212)  V232
◆
(A.16)
rV231 =  2c1 + ↵23 1  n13
2  n23   n13
✓
u+ c1 +
1
2
(V232 + V212)  V231
◆
(A.17)
We can safely assume that nij = n for all i, j because they all choose the same strategy
not to accept a good they do not want to consume. Let n = n23, n13,
rV232 =  2c2 + ↵231
2
✓
u+ c2 +
1
2
(V232 + V212)  V232
◆
(A.18)
rV231 =  2c1 + ↵231
2
✓
u+ c1 +
1
2
(V232 + V212)  V231
◆
(A.19)
Then V231  V232 must be true for agent 2 not to accept good 1 when they do not want
to consume, or V231 > V232 must be false. From the equations above, we get
V231   V232 > 0 =)  2c1 + 2c2 + ↵232 (c1   c2) > 0
(c2   c1)
⇥
2  ↵232
⇤
> 0. We get c2 > c1 and 4 > ↵23. V231 > V232 is true, so V231  V232
cannot be true. The result shows that V231 > V232 when c2 > c1. It must be the case
that exchanging good 2 for good 1 yields higher expected utility. Commodity 1 serves as a
medium of exchange for agent 2.
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Similarly we check with agent 3 holding good 3,
rV323 =  2c3 + ↵321
2
✓
u+ c3 +
1
2
(V323 + V313)  V323
◆
(A.20)
rV321 =  2c1 + ↵321
2
✓
u+ c1 +
1
2
(V323 + V313)  V321
◆
(A.21)
Then V321  V323 must be true for agent 3 not to accept good 1 when they do not want
to consume. Or V321 > V323 must be false. From the equations above, we get
V321   V323 > 0 =)  2c1 + 2c3 + ↵322 (c1   c3) > 0
(c3   c1)
⇥
2  ↵322
⇤
> 0. We get c3 > c1 and 4 > ↵32, given ↵23 2 [0, 1]. V321 > V323
is true, so V321  V323 cannot be true. The result shows that V321 > V323 when c3 > c1
and 4 > ↵32. It must be the case that exchanging good 3 for good 1 yields higher expected
utility. Commodity 1 serves as a medium of exchange for agent 3.
However, for agent 1 is the opposite case, such that V121   V123 and V131   V132. Agent 1
will not accept good 2 or 3 if he does not want to consume them.
The type 1 agent knows that type 2 and 3 agents would accept commodity 1 regardless if
they desire to consume it or not, thus all type 1 agents will search because other agents will
accept commodity 1 regardless. Since all type 1 agents search, then commodity 2 cannot
be a commodity money. It turns out that type 1 agents will not accept any good except
than his own consumption, but type 3 and 2 agent would accept good 1 even if they don’t
consume it. Then, we have a location strategy equilibrium for the asymmetric case, as shown
in Figure 3.
Let I(1, 2, 1) denotes agents who produce good 1, desire good 2, hold good 3. At steady
state, all Type 1 agents search. Half Type 1 agents desire commodity 2, I(1, 2, 1), and
another half desire commodity 3, I(1, 3, 1); the former visits market 2 and the latter visits
market 3.
Examining Type 2 agents, there are a quarter of Type 2 agents who are I(2, 1, 2) and
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I(2, 3, 2) and half of I(2, 3, 1) in the beginning of a period at steady state. I(2, 1, 2) and
I(2, 3, 2) will stay and I(2, 3, 1) will visit market 3 by holding commodity 1. Since half of
Type 2 stays in the market 2 and is visited by half of Type 3 and Type 1, each stayer of
Type 2 will meet with two visitors. With the bilateral meetings assumption, Type 2 stayers
can choose to meet with only one visitor. Since he knows that the visitors all are holding
good 1, stayers are indifferent on whom he choose to trade with. The stayer does not know
the visitors’ desired type of consumption. So, the stayer conducts a lottery to select which
two visitors he wants to meet.
After acquiring from the match and consuming the good he wants, the stayers I(2, 1, 2)
draw a new taste shock. The draw results half of the stayers I (2, 1, 2) to become I(2, 1, 2)
again and another half to become I(2, 3, 2) in the next period. As for stayers I(2, 3, 2) after
matching, they didn’t acquire the good they want but accepted commodity 1 as medium of
exchange and become a searcher I(2, 3, 1) in the next period.
Searchers of Type 2, I(2, 3, 1), ‘compete’ with I(1, 3, 1) to be chosen by type 3 stayers
to trade. All visitors at market 3 bring commodity 1; stayers are indifferent and conduct
a lottery. Since there are twice as many visitors as stayers at market 3, I(2, 3, 1) have only
half a chance to be chosen to trade in market 3. So only half of I(2, 3, 1) consume their
desired good and draw a new taste shock, either becoming I(2, 1, 2) or I(2, 3, 2). Another
half of searchers I(2, 3, 1) remains to be I(2, 3, 1) in the next period.
At the end of the period, there are a quarter of Type 2 who are I(2, 1, 2) and I(2, 3, 2)
and half who are I(2, 3, 1). Examining Type 3 will be the same as Type 2. There are a
quarter of Type 3 agents who are I(3, 1, 3) and I(3, 2, 3) and half who are I(3, 2, 1) in the
beginning of a period at steady state. Given a similar explanation as for Type 2, we get the
same result that there are a quarter of Type 3 agents who are I(3, 1, 3) and I(3, 2, 3) and
half who are I(3, 2, 1) at the beginning of the period. Half of I(1, 2, 1) and I(1, 3, 1) consume
their desired good and draw a new taste shock, so the resulting distribution is half of Type
1 will be I(1, 2, 1) and half will be I(1, 3, 1) at the end of the period.
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At steady state, I(3, 2, 3) and I(2, 3, 2) will exchange their produced commodity for
commodity 1, as a medium of exchange. Any deviation from the steady state will make
them worse off.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. Besides commodity 1 being accepted as commodity money, sup-
pose commodity 2 is also accepted as a medium of exchange such that ⇧32 = 1. First, we
look at the strategy for agent 2:
(r + ↵23)V232 =  2c2+↵23(u+ c2 + 1
2
(V232 + V212)) (A.22)
(r + ↵23)V231 =  2c1 + ↵23(u+ c1 + 1
2
(V232 + V212)) (A.23)
We have V231   V232 > 0 such that  2c1 + ↵23c1 >  2c2 + ↵23c2 , this gives us c1 > c2.
This shows that an agent holding commodity 2 will always trade for commodity 1 even if he
does not consume it, because the lighter commodity will improve his expected utility when
he searches.
Second, we look at the strategy for agent 3 :
(r + ↵32)V323 =  2c3 + ↵32(u+ c3 + 1
2
(V313 + V323)) (A.24)
(r + ↵32)V321 =  2c1 + ↵32(u+ c1 + 1
2
(V313 + V323)) (A.25)
Then V321  V323 > 0 gives us c1 > c3. This also shows that an agent holding commodity
3 will always trade for commodity 1, even if he does not consume it due to it being a lighter
commodity, and for ⇧23 2 [0, 1] still holds, regardless if holder 2 would trade for commodity
3.
Since both agent Type 2 and agent Type 3 accept commodity 1 as a medium of exchange,
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agent 1 will always search since he knows that everyone accepts his commodity 1. This
means all Type 1 agents will always search. There is no reason for agent 1 to accept other
commodities he does not want to consume because his production is widely accepted.
Since we know that agent 1 will always search, there is no one supplying good 1 in market
1. Then we check if agent 3 would accept commodity 2 as a medium of exchange. The only
Type 3 agents who would accept commodity 2 as money are those who desire good 1. So,
Type 3 agents who desire good 1 are offered good 2 when they meet with a good 2 holder
when Type 3 agent was a stayer. However, he will not accept commodity 2, even if the
transport cost is lower than commodity for 3, because no one is in market 1. Plus, agent
3 desiring good 1 is better off to stay, knowing that everyone holding good 1 will search
at equilibrium. This is the same case for agent 2 accepting commodity 3 to search for his
desired commodity 1.
Suppose the a commodity with higher transport cost is used as the money. Then a Type
1 agent will not want to exchange his good for a commodity with a higher transport cost
because he can search with commodity 1 with a lower cost. Then when a Type 1 agent visits
a market, Type 2 or 3 would accept commodity 1, even they do not consume it because
they can search in the next period, which saves them on transport cost and yields higher
utility. Hence, a commodity with the lowest transport cost will always be preferred as the
commodity money. Thus, only commodity 1 is the medium of exchange at steady state
because it has the least transport cost.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. Agent 1 produces commodity 1 and he brings his own produced
commodity to visit a market to search for the good he desires. When agent 1 holds 1 to
visit a market to get the good he desires, he will meet with someone who either desires
to consume commodity 1 or not. Regardless of the acceptability of commodity money, if
he meets someone who desires to consume commodity 1, both will barter. Hence, there is
always a bartering in an asymmetric case, together with commodity money. Bartering and
commodity money can co-exist. The agents who produce the commodity could be matched
67
with someone who desires to consume his good (a commodity money), then bartering happens
because the commodity money is also a consumption good. He could be matched someone
who don’t want to consume the commodity, but want to use it as a medium of exchange.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. With the introduction of fiat money into the model, the fiat money
is equally and identically distributed across different types of agents. From Proposition 1.3,
we know that no agent will accept any commodity as money in a symmetric environment
because there is no gain from trade. So everyone just barters if they wish to trade. With
introduction of money where the transport cost for holding money is lower than holding
their own commodity c0 < ci, a holder of commodity will trade for money to become a
moneyholder in the next period. At steady-state, everyone accepts fiat money as a medium
of exchange; only holders of money will search and holders of commodity will stay.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. Given that c0 < ci 8i, everyone accepts fiat money as a medium of
exchange at steady state because of lower transport cost. Every agent will trade for money
because it has the lowest transport cost. At the optimal money supply m = 12 , everyone
will only accept fiat money as the medium of exchange. Money is equally distributed across
agents. The cost of fiat money is lower than the cost of commodity money c0 < c1. Agents
who produce the type 1 good will trade for fiat money with a lower transport cost. Then a
quarter of type 1 agent with fiat money will be searching for good 2 and 3, respectively. The
same for type 2 agent with fiat money searching for 1 and 3, as well as, for type 3 agent
with fiat money searching for 1 and 2. Only fiat money holders will search, and thus will
be called buyers and those who do not hold fiat money will stay to be sellers. Each seller
in this case will be approached by exactly one buyer with fiat money who wants the good
sold. Then each seller will accept the fiat money in return. Every buyer will consume the
good, then produce and draw a new taste shock. In the next period, the buyer will become
seller and the seller will become a buyer. Commodity 1 no longer is the commodity money
because agent 2 and 3 would accept fiat money due to the lower transport cost. Even agent
1 would exchange commodity 1 with fiat money because it has a lower transport cost.
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No buyer will want to deviate from searching because he could not trade for his desired
good if he stays with fiat money. So a money holder is better off to search and be a buyer.
No seller will want to deviate from staying because he knows there is an exact match with
a buyer to get a unit of fiat money in each period, given that   is large enough. Deviating to
search instead of stay, means the deviator will encounter half the chance of being matched
with a double coincidence of wants. So he is better off to stay and match with a buyer
to get a unit of fiat money, then search for his consumption good with the probability 1.
Hence the asymmetric fiat equilibrium has the same outcome, where only money holders
search and non-money holders stay. When the money supply is optimal, it creates a perfect
coordination environment where everyone gets the good they want over two-periods. The
optimality of money supply is defined as fraction of agents who hold money that gives the
highest attainable expected utiity among agents.
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Appendix B: Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. An agent can always choose to stay at home or at his market, which
gives him a lower bound of zero utility. It costs him nothing to stay at home or his market.
If other strategies give value lower than zero, he will always choose to stay home. So, he can
always choose the strategy to stay home or at his market. Hence the value function cannot
be lower than zero. This lemma is also established by Goldberg (2007).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. If an agent carries both money and a good into the marketplace for
trade, he would barter to get his desired good if he finds a seller who likes his good. Otherwise
he would exchange with money, unless the seller is already a moneyholder.
Suppose that exchanging with money is preferred to bartering when a searcher brings
both money and a good to the market.
(B.1)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm] + mU
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
where the offer of money is preferred for trade
>
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
where the bartering is preferred for trade
The RHS denotes the value function for a searcher searching with a good and money
who prefers to barter, whereas the LHS denotes the value function for a searcher seaching
with a good and money who prefers to offer money in exchange for a good. The inequality
becomes:
(B.2)
mU
r(k   1) >
 ⇧(1 m)
r(k   1) [U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)
Rearranging this inequality gives
(B.3)U(1  1
⇧
) + x > Wm  W1
The incentive condition for holding money is
 x  ✏+Wm  W1 > 0 and ⇧ = 1, (B.4)
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hence, Wm  W1 > x+ ✏ > x for ✏ > 0.
But the inequality from the incentive condition for holding money and ⇧ = 1 imply:
x > Wm  W1, (B.5)
which contradicts.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Assume that an agent will choose not to search if the alternative
strategies give the same utility. We have to show that no one would accept money in an
exchange and bringing money to market are redundant, such that,
max{V1, S1}    x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb} (B.6)
and no one would choose to search. To show that no one would choose to search, it also
means that all agents would prefer to stay, such that V1  S1 = 0,max{Vm, Vb}  Sm = 0.
This implies that n1, nc, nm = 0. This causes the Equations [2.1] and [2.2] to become:
(B.7)W1 = max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
V1 :search with commodity
, 0|{z}
S1 :stay with commodity
}
Wm = max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
Vc :search with commodity
, 0|{z}
Sm :stay with money and commodity
}
(B.8)
In a non-monetary autarkic equilibrium, S1 > V1, therefore:
c1   u
(k   1) (B.9)
and, Sm   Vm gives:
cm   (1 m)[U + x] (B.10)
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Since no one chooses the strategy to search, no matching will occur and no exchange can
take place. This is an equilibrium because the cost of searching exceeds the expected gain
in utility from matching.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. For a non-monetary bartering equilibrium, agents are indifferent
between searching with a commodity and staying, such that V1 = S1, Vc = Sm, and
max{Vc, Sm} > Vm. This implies that nm = nb = 0, so the Equations [2.1] and [2.2]
become:
W1 = max{ U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
,
n1U(1 m)
r(k   1) +
mncU
r(k   1)} (B.11)
Wm = max{⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x]  cm
r| {z }
Vm :search with money
,
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
,
n1U(1 m)
r(k   1) +
mncU
r(k   1)} (B.12)
When a moneyholder abandons searching with money because max{Vc, Sm} > Vm , his
payoff for W1 is the same as for a non-moneyholder. This means their strategic behavior is
the same, so the distribution of agents with or without money will be the same, such that
n1 = nc = ✓.
Letting nc = n1 = ✓ gives:
u
r(k   1)  
c1
r
=
✓u(1 m)
r(k   1) +
✓um
r(k   1) (B.13)
and solving for ✓ gives:
✓ = 1  c1(k   1)
u
(B.14)
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and, 0 < ✓ < 1 since 0 < n1, nc < 1, then
u
c1
+ 1 > k > 1 (B.15)
It must be the case that the value of searching with a commodity is greater than 0,
satisfying Lemma 2.1.
c1 <
u
k   1 (B.16)
k <
u
c1
+ 1. (B.17)
Proof of Proposition 2.3. To search with money, the condition for a moneyholder is:
max{Vm, Vb} > max{Vc, Sm} (B.18)
To accept money in exchange for a good, the condition for the non-moneyholder is
 x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb, Vc, Sm} > max{V1, S1} (B.19)
From the condition to search with money, the equation above can be simplified to
 x  ✏+max{Vm, Vb} > max{V1, S1} (B.20)
It would be sufficient to show that Wm > W1 to ensure the monetary equilibrium con-
dition is satisfied. Thus, Vc is redundant to check in the sense that Wm > W1 equals
Wm > max{V1, S1} where W1 = max{V1, S1}. Given that the value function of a money-
holder searching with commodity only is Vc, Vc = V1 means Wm > max{V1, S1}   Vc. As
long as the condition for monetary equilibrium is satisfied, search with a commodity is not
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profitable for a moneyholder.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. From Proposition 2.2, we know that an agent will only search when
c1 >
u
k 1 , hence the LHS of the inequality is satisfied such that k >
u
c1
+ 1.
As for the RHS of the inequality, from Proposition 2.3, we know that the inequality must
satisfy:
(B.21)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
searching only with money
 ⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
searching with money and a commodity
(B.22)c1  1
k   1[mU + (1 m)[x+W1  Wm]] + cm
Hence, there exists a k such that k  mU+(1 m)[x+W1 Wm]c1 cm + 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. For an agent to choose a pure strategy of searching only with
money, the value function of searching with only money must exceed the value of holding
both money and a commodity, as follows:
(B.23)
⇧(1 m)
r
[U + x+W1  Wm]  cm
r| {z }
searching only with money
>
⇧(1 m)
r
(1  1
k   1)[U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r| {z }
searching with money and a commodity
(B.24)c1   cm >  ⇧(1 m)
k   1 [U + x+W1  Wm] +
U
(k   1)
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(B.25)c1   cm > 1
k   1[U(1  ⇧(1 m)) + ⇧(1 m)[x+W1  Wm]]
For a monetary equilibrium, ⇧ is assumed to be 1. Hence,
(B.26)c1 >
1
k   1[mU + (1 m)[x+W1  Wm]] + cm
The above inequality is satisfied when k is sufficiently large.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. For any r,m, c1, cm :
lim
k!1
V1 = lim
k!1
U
r(k   1)  
c1
r
=  c1
r
< 0 (B.27)
lim
k!1
Sm  0 (B.28)
lim
k!1
S1   0 (B.29)
lim
k!1
(Vm   Vb)   0 (B.30)
lim
k!1
(Vm   S1)   0 (B.31)
This satisfies the incentive constraint for holding money such that Vm = max{Vm, Vb} >
S1   0 and Lemma 2.1 for the exchange participating constraint.
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Appendix C: Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. It follows from a comparison of equations [3.7] and [3.22]. Let
B =
(2k   3)
(k   1)2
NX
n=1
1n (C.1)
Then we have @B@k < 0 and limk!1B = 0 for any k > 2. The market gets more difficult to
clear as the number of types of good increases. With algebra manupulation of B, the market
can only clear without the use of money when k = 2. When k = 1, it is not meaningful
because everyone is self-sufficienct in production and there is no need for money and market
to trade.
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